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SUMMARY
In recent years, cognitive radio (CR) as a novel communication paradigm has triggered
great interest in the research community (see two comprehensive surveys [1, 2]). This
communication paradigm is capable of dynamically sensing and accessing unused or under-
utilized spectrum bands in a target licensed spectrum pool and of communicating via these
spectrum bands without causing any harmful interference to the primary (licensed) users
(PUs).
As indicated in the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) report [3], 90% of the
licensed spectrum bands remain idle at a given time and location, while remaining spec-
tra for further licensing become more and more scarce. To solve this problem, CR, with
its ability of opportunistic and dynamic spectrum access [2], is regarded as a promising
technology to effectively address the spectrum-insufficiency problem for future wireless
communications. For CR users or secondary users (SUs)1, two spectrum-access schemes
exist: namely, spectrum underlay and spectrum overlay [4]. The spectrum overlay im-
proves spectrum utilization by granting SUs the authority to sense and explore the unused
spectrum offered by PUs. In this scenario, SUs can use the unused channels of PUs and
transmit with full power on these channels. The spectrum underlay is another spectrum-
access scheme that further improves the under-utilized spectrum resource. It permits SUs
to share the same spectrum bands with PUs at the same time and location. In the spectrum
overlay, designing effective and efficient spectrum-sensing [2] techniques in the physical
layer for cognitive radio networks (CRNs) is the major concern. The SUs first detect the
existence of active PUs on the PUs’ channels; if the PU on a specific channel is detected to
be idle (or inactive), then, the SUs can use this channel for their own data communications,
and vice versa. In the spectrum underlay, SUs need to restrict their transmit power to not
cause severe interference to PUs. So, the power-control problem is the major concern in
1the terms ”cognitive radio users” and ”secondary users” are used alternatively in this research.
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spectrum-underlay CRNs, and it is one of the kernel problems in the resource-allocation
framework [5] of CRNs.
In this research, we mainly focus on the power-control problem in the spectrum-underlay
CRNs. Compared to the traditional network-utility-maximization (NUM) framework [6]
that is used to find the optimal transmit powers for the aggregated network-throughput
maximization in traditional wireless data networks such as cellular networks, ad hoc net-
works, and wireless sensor networks, the sharp difference from CRNs lie in the feature
of opportunistic and competitive spectrum access among SUs, where the non-cooperative
game theory, as a standard mathematical tool, is used to control each SU’s transmit pow-
er results in each SU’s own utility maximization (see a survey paper [7]). Regardless of
the specific problems and/or application scenarios, this research aims to both mitigate the
interference from SUs to PUs that guarantees the quality-of-service (QoS) of primary com-
munications and to maximize the utility (or revenue) of each individual SU among all the
competitive SUs in CRNs.
Then, after finishing the investigation of the power-control problem for practical CRNs,
a theoretic research to understand the fundamental throughput capacity for the newly aris-
ing cognitive radio ad hoc networks (CRAHNs) is then conducted. This work corresponds
to the scaling law of cognitive radio ad hoc networks (CRAHNs). CRAHNs, as surveyed
in [5], will be a type of powerful distributed wireless networks for military and civilian
communications in the upcoming decades. The scaling law study of CRAHNs has gained
much interest in the research community. This research is stimulated by the seminal work
of Gupta and Kumar [8] on the fundamental throughput capacity scaling law for large-
scale wireless ad hoc networks. It has became an active research topic in recent years,
e.g., [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]. As shown in [8], the per-node2 throughput capacity for the
wireless ad hoc networks is Θ(W/
√
n log n) 3bits/sec in the random and static deployment
2the term ”node” and ”user” are used interchangeably in this research.
3We use the same notations g(n) = Θ( f (n)), g(n) = Ω( f (n)), g(n) = ω( f (n)), g(n) = O( f (n)),
g(n) = o( f (n)), etc. as in [8]. Notation W stands for the available network bandwidths; n denotes the
density of the ad hoc networks. In the following discussion, n denotes the density of CRAHNs; m denotes
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condition, where W stands for the available network bandwidths and n denotes the density
of the ad hoc networks. This result shows that the per-node throughput for wireless ad hoc
networks decreases with the increase of the network density. It indicates that the capacity
scaling of wireless ad hoc networks is not so promising when compared to wireline net-
works, where the constant capacity scaling Θ(1) can always be achieved. Motivated by the
research on classic wireless ad hoc networks [8], the scaling-law research on CRAHNs has
also triggered great interest recently (see literature review in section 1.3).
In this work, a research on CRAHNs that takes into account the impact of PU activity
[5] is studied. “CRAHNs under the impact of PU activity” is a typical and important
network scenario for CRAHNs that has never been considered in the research community
yet. This research aims to give an in-depth study of the scaling law of CRAHNs in this
network scenario. This work is believed to have unique value, and it will have an impact to
the research community.





1.1.1 Power Control in Cognitive Radio Networks
In Cognitive Radio (CR) [2] networks, power control deals with the selection of prop-
er transmit power for CR users’ transmissions that achieves high spectrum efficiency by
enabling CR users to reuse the PUs’ spectrum bands under the interference constraints im-
posed by PUs. In the next generation wireless communications, CR users are expected
to be uncoordinated opportunistic users, whereas there are conflicting interests among the
CR users [13], [14]. This motivates the use of noncooperative game theory to do research
on CR networks (see a survey paper [13]). Compared to traditional centralized solution-
s, the game-theoretical approach has the advantage of distributed implementation for CR
networks: each CR user only takes care of their own utility maximization, and it does not
need to know other users’ payoff (or utility function).
1.1.1.1 Power-Control Game in Wideband Cognitive Radio Networks
The power-control problem is especially important for wideband CRNs, since the networks
are interference-limited. As indicated in FCC report [15], CDMA is one of the natural
underlay communication schemes in CRNs. Especially, for competitive CR users in CRNS,
the power-control problem by applying non-cooperative game theory has been thoroughly
investigated in the research community (see literature review in subsection 1.2.1).
The major contributions of the related research on power control can be summarized as
follows: to find the optimal transmit power that maximizes each SU’s own utility and/or
guarantees the fairness among SUs. And, usually, the SUs’ SINRs are used as their QoS
performance metric. As we know, besides acquiring enough transmit power to guarantee
reliable communication links, different SUs need to support heterogenous services with
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different transmission rates. For example, some SUs require real-time multimedia trans-
missions, while other SUs require non-real-time data transmissions. In the wideband com-
munication (e.g. CDMA, UWB) scenarios, a SU with a high SINR might not be allocated
an adequate transmission rate to accomplish its communication task. So, to provide flexi-
ble transmission rates for SUs, efficient use of radio resources requires a transmission-rate
control in addition to transmit-power control. And, this motivate our first investigation on
joint power and rate control for wideband CR users, which is proved to be an effective way
to improve the users’ utility and network performance.
1.1.1.2 Power-Control Game in Fading and Multi-Channel Cognitive Radio Networks
To date, power control of CR users in non-fading environments gains intensively research in
the research community (see literature review in subsection 1.2.1 and subsection 1.2.2). In
all of these works, the authors considered quasi-stationary wireless channel model, where
the channel gains are known and stationary over time. However, these assumptions are
only a special case in practice, and terminal users experience frequent channel changes
over time dynamically. Especially in CR networks, CR users need to update power level-
s frequently to maintain their SINR level (usually referred as QoS) due to channel fading.
Furthermore, the transmissions outage of PUs due to channel fading and interferences from
CR users should be addressed when the power control of CR users is concerned. To the
best of our knowledge, existing works on power control for CR users in fading channels
are only [16] and [17], in which the authors studied the ergodic capacity maxi- mization
problems for a single user case. The multi-user power-control problems are of much more
interest and importance in practical CR networks. However, there is no existing work to
study this problem. Moreover, power control in Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplex-
ing Access (OFDMA)/multi-channel CRNs has also received much attention in the research
community. Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) is regarded as a poten-
tial transmission technology for the future CR systems due to its flexibility in allocating
resources and high achievable data rate. So, motivated by the growing interest of general
2
multi-channel case (contains the single-channel case) performance in fading environments,
we consider the multiuser power-control problem for CR networks over multiple channels
using a game-theoretical approach. The fundamental performance traits of multiple CR us-
er power control are investigated in the presence of multiple primary users (PUs) in fading
channels for the first time.
1.1.1.3 Learning-based Power-Control Game Cognitive Radio Networks
As we know, game-theoretical approach provides distributive solutions for CRNs. Howev-
er, to conduct the power-control game, a selection of the optimal power strategy for each
CR user requires its rivals’ (i.e. other CR users in the network) interference channel and
transmit power strategy information. There are overhead costs for channel estimations and
information exchange of power strategies among difference CR users. The information ex-
change among CR users by using non-cooperative game theory would scale in a order of
Θ(N2), which is infeasible in the large network deployment.
In the power-control game of CR networks, two fundamentally conflicting objectives
exist in CR networks. On the one hand, each CR user wishes to achieve higher Signal-
to-Interference plus Noise Ratio (SINR) and get higher transmission rates, which results
in better Quality of Service (QoS); on the other hand, this higher SINR is achieved at the
expense of higher interference to other CR users and to PUs. This selfish behavior of
users would lead to network performance degradation [18], which is called the “tragedy
of commons” in economics. To solve this problem, most of the existing works introduce
“pricing” [19] as an incentive scheme to facilitate more efficient resource utilization for
selfish CR users [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25]. However, the pricing-based scheme re-
quires a certain degree of cooperation among CR users, and it is difficult to configure and
implement pricing schemes in CR networks, since there lacks a centralized coordinator
and/or there is no single creditable user in CR networks. Moreover, price-based incentive
schemes can incur significant overheads in the algorithm design. For example, in [26],
a self-incentive pricing scheme is adopted, where each CR user checks the best pricing
3
factors for every power control strategy at the Nash equilibrium. This scheme has high
implementation complexity, which might not be suitable in the large network deployment.
As we have noticed, the above works [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25] focused on power
control in the slow channel-varying or no-fading environments, where the channel infor-
mation exchange need not to be performed so frequently. Power control for CR networks
in fading environments has also being studied [27] [28] [29]. These works indicate that
the acquisition of adequate Channel State Information (CSI) from PUs that results in better
throughput for CR users in fast channel-varying environments is a hard problem.
Moreover, due to the opportunistically and heterogenous nature of CR users, CR users
are most likely to be autonomous users. The usual assumption of spontaneous willingness
to exchange their private information, e.g., channel and strategy information, is unrealistic
for conflicting-interest CR users. Moreover, the existing conflicting interest among CR
users might cause dishonest behavior in resource competition, e.g., CR users may even
exchange false private information about their channel conditions in order to get more
access to the spectrum [30]; some of the CR users may even emulate the PUs’ behavior
to attack other CR users with known channel statistics [31] and with unknown channel
statistics [32].
Our proposed work is motivated by the drawbacks of classic game-theoretical ap-
proaches stated above, and the growing interest from the research community that con-
cerns on fully distributed power-control algorithms for CR networks (see literature review
in subsection 1.2.3): the demand of robust distributed power-control algorithms with low
communication overheads for opportunistic and competitive CR users.
1.1.2 Capacity Analysis in cognitive radio ad hoc networks (CRAHNs)
The CRAHNs, as surveyed in [5], will be a type of powerful distributed wireless network-
s for military and civil communications in the next decades. The scaling law study of
CRAHNs has gained much interest in the research community.
Stimulated by the seminal work of Gupta and Kumar [8], the fundamental throughput
4
scaling law for large-scale wireless ad hoc networks has become an active research top-
ic [8] [9] [10] [31-37] [88-90] in recent years. It is shown in [8] that the per-node through-
put capacity for the wireless ad hoc networks is Θ(W/
√
n log n)1 bits/sec in the random and
static deployment condition. When allowing nodes to move independently and uniformly
in the network region, the authors in [9] shows that a constant per-node throughput capacity
can be achieved. Since throughput and delay are important network performance metrics,
consequently significant effort has been devoted to research their trade-off in wireless net-
works [31-35]. In [10], the optimal delay-throughput tradeoff is established for both static
and mobile wireless networks. The delay and throughput have also been studied under
different mobility models, such as [33] [34].
Compared to classical wireless ad hoc networks, the key distinguishing factors of the
dynamic network topology, and the time and the location varying spectrum availability
make the analysis of scaling laws for CRAHNs very challenging. The research on scal-
ing laws, i.e., the asymptotic throughput capacity and delay, etc., for CRAHNs is still in
the infancy phase [35] [36] [37]. In [35] [36], the throughput scaling is considered for
the CRAHNs under the spectrum sharing scheme of spectrum underlay [2] by making use
of spatial domain, which enables secondary (unlicensed) users to coexist with PUs in the
licensed spectrum bands while causing no excessive interference to PUs. It is shown that
both CRAHN and primary network can simultaneously achieve the same throughput scal-
ing law as a stand-alone network: specifically, the per-node throughput capacity of primary
network and the CRAHN are Θ(W/
√
m log m) bits/sec and Θ(W/
√
n log n) bits/sec respec-
tively. In [37], the throughput capacity of multi-channel wireless networks is investigated
in the presence of constraints on channel switching. Indicated in [37], the network scenario
is applicable to CRAHNs where the secondary users utilize a portion of the spectrum that
is not being used by PUs (multi-spectrum feature). They introduce an assignment model
1We use the same notations g(n) = Θ( f (n)), g(n) = Ω( f (n)), g(n) = ω( f (n)), g(n) = O( f (n)),
g(n) = o( f (n)), etc. as in [1]. Notation W stands for the available network bandwidths; n denotes the
density of CRAHNs; in the following discussion, m denotes the density of primary networks.
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wherein a node can only switch between a set of f contiguous channels (2≤ f ≤ c), where
c is the number of total subchannels. The per-flow capacity for the adjacent (c, f ) chan-
nel assignment model is shown to be Θ(W
√
f
cn log n ), where f /c ≤ 1. As shown in [38],
this spectrum sharing scheme is referred as spectrum overlay [2] by making use of the fre-
quency domain. Moreover, beside the spectrum access schemes by making use of spatial
domain and frequency domain, the spectrum overlay can also make use of time domain
where secondary users utilize the time slots based on the on-and-off activity of PUs’ traffic
load [38] (time-varying feature).
To our best knowledge, the scaling laws which consider the important time-varying fea-
ture of spectrum sharing schemes in CRAHNs due to PU activity in spectrum overlay is
still not touched in the research community to date. As pointed out in [5], the PU activity
is the one of the dominant features that affects the secondary spectrum access, and nearly
all the challenging networking issues raised in CRAHNs, such as routing, MAC, topology
control and spectrum decision, etc. are its direct outcome. Moreover, its importance at-
tracts the recent intense research on PU activity measuring and modeling [5] [39], accurate
modulation of which impacts on the performance analysis and network design of CRAHNs.
1.2 Literature Review:Power Control in Cognitive Radio Networks
Cognitive radio cooperated with the advanced physical-layer communications schemes
such as, code division multiple access (CDMA) and ultra-wideband (UWB) in wideband
communications systems, and multi-channel/OFDMA in narrowband communications sys-
tems, generate different types of CRNs. Although they have their own unique features and
advantages that further improve the spectra utilization for next generation wireless commu-
nications (see their applications in [16]), these CRNs have recently gained insensitive stud-
ies. Moreover, besides the above CRNs with the advanced physical-layer communications
schemes. the growing interest concerning with more distributed and robust solutions of
power-control algorithms in CRNs from the research community intrigues us to design the
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power-control algorithm with low implementation-complexity for realistic CRNs. In this
section, the state-of-art research progress of power control in CRNs is reviewed, which in-
cludes power control in wideband CRNs, power control in fading and mutli-channel CRNs
and learning-based power control in CRNs.
1.2.1 Power-Control Game in Wideband Cognitive Radio Networks
The power-control problem for traditional cellular wireless networks was addressed in sev-
eral classic papers [40–42]. The power-control problem in wireless networks with compet-
itive users was also investigated in the literature. A non-cooperative uplink power-control
game was formulated in [42], the outcome of which resulted in a Nash equilibrium that was
inefficient. Therefore, a pricing scheme was introduced in order to obtain Pareto improve-
ment.
In CRNs, two game-theoretic power-allocation schemes were proposed in [43] to achieve
efficiency and fairness for SUs. Price was used as a control parameter in the CRN to achieve
objectives such as efficiency. However, the utility maximization for each SU was not con-
sidered. In [44], a general power-control model was proposed for CRNs. The primary
network was considered to regularly monitor the interference from all SUs, and the be-
havior of SUs was modeled as a non-cooperative power-control game. In that game, the
utility function of each SU was the logarithm of the user’s Signal to Interference and Noise
Ratio (SINR) which represented the throughput of communication systems in the high S-
INR regime. The existence, uniqueness and Pareto efficiency of the Nash equilibrium were
also investigated. In [20], the authors addressed the problem of utility-maximization for
PUs and presented a Stackelberg game2 model for PUs and SUs. However, it ignored the
constraints on the PUs’ resource usage and performance guarantees for the SUs.
The pricing schemes in CRNs have been considered in recent literatures. In [21],
the authors investigated several different secondary pricing by capturing the effects of
2It is a dynamic model of duopoly proposed by Stackerlberg (1934) in which a dominant (or leader) firm
moves first, and a subordinate (or follower) moves second [45].
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network-wide interferences. The dynamics of price competition among competitive spec-
trum providers was analyzed in [22]. The problem of pricing-based utility-maximization
for the spectrum owners was addressed in [23, 46]; however, the resource constraints and
performance guarantees for SUs were not considered. In [25], the pricing issue was studied
in a competitive CRN in which the SUs strategically adjusted their uplink transmit-power
levels to maximize their own utilities, and the primary service provider charged the SUs on
their transmit-power levels to enhance its own utility.
The problem of power-control and rate-adaptation for SUs in a CDMA environment
was recently considered in [47]. This work adopted the classic NUM [6] framework for the
SUs given the interference constraints from PUs. The SUs have a QoS constraint in terms of
minimum SINR and transmission rate. As we have explained in Chapter I, this framework
is not suitable for the competitive SUs in CRNs. Usually, different SUs have their own
transmission rate and utility; an aggregated network throughput will not be appropriate.
Thus, the behavior and equilibrium points among these competitive SUs with different
utilities should be studied and understood. Moreover, a pricing scheme was not introduced
in [47].
1.2.2 Power-Control Game in Fading and Multi-channel Cognitive Radio Networks
1.2.2.1 Power-Control Game in fading-channel Cognitive Radio Networks
In [16], the authors considered a CR system in fading wireless channels and proposed an
opportunistic power-control strategy for a CR user, which protected the PU’s transmis-
sion and realized spectrum sharing between the PU and the CR user. Via opportunistically
adapting its transmit power, the CR user could maximize its achievable transmission rate
without degrading the outage probability of the PU. In [48], the authors studied the opti-
mal power-control policies for fading channels in CRNs by considering both the transmit-
and the interference-power constraints. For each of the constraints, the peak power and
the average power were investigated. The optimal power-allocation strategies in terms of
maximizing the ergodic capacity of the SU was derived when the channel state information
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was available to the transmitter and the receiver. In [49], an adaptive-power-control scheme
was proposed for a cognitive radio system (CRS) in a Rayleigh-fading channel. By allow-
ing transmit-power adaptation at the SU transmitter to maintain a constant output Signal to
Noise Ratio (SNR) to the SU receiver, this scheme maximized the output SNR and limited
the interference to a PU within an interference constraint. In [50], the authors considered a
CRN where a SU shared the same narrow band with a PU for transmission. A new type of
constraint for the SU to protect the primary transmission was proposed, which limited the
maximum outage probability of the primary transmission subject to the SU’s interference
to be below a prescribed target. The optimal power-allocation strategies over block-fading
channels were proposed for the SU to achieve its outage capacity.
The works [20]-[23] mainly focused on the information-theoretical capacity analysis of
a single SU in a single fading-channel scenario, whereas the important network scenario of
multi-channel and multi-user power control for practical CRNs in fading environments is
missing.
1.2.2.2 Power-Control Game in multi-channel Cognitive Radio Networks
In a wireless network where both the primary system and the secondary system employ the
OFDM (or multi-channel) transmission technology, the SUs can flexibly fill in the spec-
tral gaps left by the PUs [51] or transmit over the unused subchannels left in the primary
system [52]. Even If there are no unused subchannels left in the primary system, SU can
flexibly share the subchannels with the PUs, with the interference-power constraints to
protect the PUs [53]. In [53], when the SU and the PU coexist in the same bands, with
individual interference-power constraint imposed on each subcarrier to protect the primary
transmission, the optimal power-allocation strategy to maximize the rate of the SU was
derived. In [54], the authors considered a spectrum-sharing environment where an OFDM-
based CR system sharing the same band with an OFDMA primary system. A new type
of constraint referred to as the rate-loss-constraint, in the form of an upper bound on the
rate loss of PU due to the secondary transmission, was used to protect the PU. The optimal
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power-allocation strategy was proposed to maximize the rate of SUs subject to the PUs’
rate-loss constraint. In [30], the distributed multi-channel power allocation for spectrum-
sharing CRNs with QoS-guarantee is studied by using the non-cooperative game theory.
The problem is formulated as a non-cooperative game with coupled constraints of the co-
channel interference among SUs and the interference-temperature regulation imposed by
primary systems. The properties of the Nash equilibrium for the proposed game including
the existence and QoS provisioning are thoroughly investigated. A layered structure by
applying the Lagrangian dual-decomposition is derived, and a distributed algorithm to find
the Nash equilibrium is designed via this structure.
The above work [51-54] focused on maximizing the aggregated network throughout
for the SUs in a OFDMA/multi-channel-based CRNs, while work [30] aimed to study
individual throughput maximization for competitive SUs in a multi-channel CRNs. To
the best of our knowledge, the performance of multiple SUs in a fading multi-channel
environment is not studied yet. However, this is a practical network scenario where the
OFDMA-based CRNs [16] lie in the fading environments.
1.2.3 Learning-based Power-Control Game in Cognitive Radio Networks
As discussed in subsections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, the CR users are considered to be selfish termi-
nal users, they compete the spectrum resources of PUs to maximize their own utilities. This
motivates the applying of non-cooperative game theory to do the research in CRNs, and the
above preliminary research on wideband CDMA and fading and multi-channel CRNs are
the representative ones.
As we know, power-control problem is one of the key research issues in spectrum under-
lay CR networks. Especially, the non-cooperative behaviors among CR users by applying
game theory has gained intensively study in recent years in CR networks, e.g. [22], [14],
[27], [20], [21], [23], [25], [26], [24]. Almost all of them assume the CSI among CR users
and from CR users to PUs is known3. As we know, the channel estimation among CR users
3Usually, researchers assume the CSI estimation among the CR-Tx and CR-Rx is via classical channel
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requires cooperation of all CR users, which has high communication costs. Moreover, it
requires the willingness and honest behaviors of all CR users, which might not be appli-
cable for autonomous CR users. Also, the CSI estimation from CR users to PUs is a hard
problem [29]4 that researchers usually ignored, where obvious cooperation among PUs and
CR users are not permitted in CR.
The pricing scheme in CRNs has been considered in recent literatures [20], [21], [23],
[25], [26], [24], [22]. Pricing has the advantage to improve the spectrum utilization. It
is also a good approach to control the interference from CR users to PUs [26] and facili-
tate spectrum auction for CR users offered by PUs [43]. However, it requires cooperative
behaviors among CR users and/or PUs, and the implementation complexity is high.
Nowadays, the research community shows more and more interests on designing ful-
ly distributed power-control algorithms for CR networks. This is especially important for
competitive and autonomous CR users for future wireless communications in tough radio-
access environments. Two of the key research issues are as follows: a) how to reduce or
eliminate the overhand of CSI and power strategy information exchange among CR users
that grants a robust distributed network; b) how to effectively estimate and explore the CSI
from PUs for CR users’ power control. For the research issue b), there already have several
works; there is seldom work on the research issue a). In [29], the authors proposed a novel
power control scheme to maximize the capacity of a single CR user by exploring the PU’s
CSI, which is based on the measurement of the average interference-power constraint at
the PU-Rx. In [55], the authors considered the scenario on utilizing the PU’s ACK/NAK
information to maximize the utility of a single CR user. However, both [55] and [29] con-
sidered only a single SU. In [56], the authors considered the power control of multiple CR
users by letting them listen to the PU’s feedback channel as an external inference signal for
training, estimation, and feedback mechanisms, while, for CSI estimation from the PU-Tx to the CR-Rx ,
they assume CR users have the preknowledge on the PR-Tx power level and the channel reciprocity, when
estimating the received signal power from the PR-Tx.
4The PUs’ CSI to the CR-Tx can be obtained by applying, 1) eavesdropping the CSI feedback from the
PU-Rx to the PU-Tx; 2) the feedback from a cooperative sensing node located in the vicinity of the PU-Rx.
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coordination among distributed CR transmitters. This distributed power-control algorithm
can approximate the optimal solution without PU cooperation, central controller/monitor,
or inter-SU message passing. However, the proposed algorithm is only effective for the
sum-utility maximization, where the utility of each CR user only requires the CSI of itself.
The utility function in [56] does not take other CR users’ interference into account, which
avoids the interference CSI estimation among CR users.
As we know, the formulated problem and the proposed algorithm in [56] have the draw-
back of inaccurate throughput characterization, which provides a suboptimal solution for
CR networks. Moreover, the sum-utility maximization is not suitable for competitive and
autonomous CR users. Our learning-based power control scheme differs from previous
works in at least one of the following aspects: 1) this work provides a first solution for the
incomplete-information power control for competitive and autonomous CR users; 2) differ-
ent from [56], our work considers the interference among multiplier CR users (attacks the
research issue b)) that provides an accurate throughput characterization for each CR user;
3) this work discloses the relationship between the incomplete-information power-control
game and the classic complete-information power-control game; 4) the convergence and
learning rate upper-bound is provided theoretically; 5) the algorithm is robust and adaptive
to dynamic changing wireless environment and varying PUs’ activities.
Learning-based power-control game has also been studied in other wireless networks.
In [57], a non-cooperative power-control algorithm with repeated games was studied for
ad hoc networks. The authors provided the important insight that a felicitous intelligent
learning behavior with self-incentive dynamics could eventually converge to steady state
with a satisfactory system performance. In [22], a distributed discrete power-control prob-
lem was formulated as an N-person nonzero sum game. The proposed stochastic learning
power-control algorithm were proved to converge to a stable Nash equilibrium.
In our earlier work [58], we presented a framework for multiple CR users to perform
distributed power control through reinforcement learning. In this research, we expand that
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work and provide more descriptions of the learning mechanism for wireless environments,
the properties and advantage of applying the Bush-Mosteller reinforcement scheme, and
the convergence and learning rate analyses for the proposed power-control algorithm.
1.3 Literature Review: Capacity Analysis in Cognitive Radio Net-
works
Stimulated by the seminal work of Gupta and Kumar [8], the fundamental throughput ca-
pacity scaling for large-scale wireless ad hoc networks has become an active research topic
in recent years, e.g., [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]. Compared to classical wireless ad hoc net-
works, the key distinguishing factors of the dynamic network topology, and the time and
the location varying spectrum availability make the analysis of scaling laws for CRAHNs
very challenging. The research on scaling laws, i.e., the asymptotic throughput capacity
and delay, etc., for CRAHNs is still in the infancy phase [59], [35] [36] [37]. In [59], the
scaling law is studied for single-hop CRNs. In [35] [36], the throughput capacity scaling
is considered for the CRAHNs under the spectrum-sharing scheme of the spectrum under-
lay [2] that makes use of the spatial domain. This scheme enables SUs to coexist with
PUs in the licensed spectrum bands while causing no excessive interference to PUs. It is
shown that both the CRAHN and the primary network can simultaneously achieve the same
throughput scaling as a stand-alone network: specifically, the per-node throughput capacity
of the primary network and the CRAHN are Θ(W/
√
m log m)5 bits/sec and Θ(W/
√
n log n)
bits/sec respectively. In [37], the throughput capacity of multi-channel wireless ad hoc
networks is investigated in the presence of constraints on channel switching. Indicated
in [37], the network scenario is applicable to CRAHNs where the SUs utilize a portion
of the spectrum that is not being used by PUs (multi-spectrum feature). They introduce a
channel-assignment model wherein a node can only switch between a set of f contiguous
channels (2≤ f ≤c), where c is the number of total subchannels. The per-flow capacity for
5Notation W stands for the available network bandwidths; n denotes the density of CRAHNs; m denotes
the density of primary networks.
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the adjacent (c, f ) channel-assignment model is shown to be Θ(W
√
f
cn log n ), where f /c≤1.
As shown in [2], this spectrum-sharing scheme is referred as the spectrum overlay [5] that
makes use of the frequency domain. Moreover, besides the spectrum-access schemes that
make use of the spatial domain and the frequency domain, the spectrum overlay can also
make use of the time domain, where SUs use the time slots based on the on-and-off activity
of PUs’ traffic loads [2](time-varying feature).
To the best of our knowledge, the scaling-law research which considers the important
time-varying feature of the spectrum-sharing schemes in CRAHNs under the impact of PU
activity in the spectrum overlay is still not touched in the research community.
1.4 Our Approaches and Thesis Outline
In Chapter 2, the decentralized behavior of power and rate control in wideband CRNs
is considered, where each SU competes for radio resources in the wideband spectrum-
underlay CRNs. The problem of optimal power- and rate-control is investigated for each
individual SU by using the non-cooperative game theory. The formulated problem satisfies
the following two operational constraints in CRNs : (1) the total amount of interference
power caused by SUs to PUs must not exceed a predefined threshold; (2) for each SU, the
received SINR must exceed a predefined threshold to guarantee its QoS. The utility func-
tion considered in this research measures the throughput (transmission rate) per transmit
power. It guarantees energy efficiency and fairness among SUs. The utility function is e-
specially suitable for the feature of energy-constrained, low-power and competition-based
data communication of SUs.
The formulated problem is a constrained game-theoretic problem [45]. By introducing
pricing into the utility functions, the interference power caused from each SU to PUs is
charged by price, which is a more intuitive representation compared to the original problem.
Meanwhile, as we know, pricing is also an effective tool for radio resource management
because of its ability to guide user’s behavior toward a more efficient operating point [42].
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That means, on one hand, that we can use the pricing to study the interference power
caused by SUs; on the other hand, the net utilities or the satisfactions experienced by SUs
will be greatly improved when a proper pricing mechanism is introduced. Based on these
analyses, the non-cooperative joint-power and rate-control game with interference-power
pricing is proposed. A detailed analyses of the existence, uniqueness, and Pareto efficiency
of the Nash equilibrium for the proposed game are presented. Then, a joint-power and rate-
control algorithm is proposed to find the optimal transmission rates and transmit powers for
SUs. Moreover, the process of seeking the best interference-power pricing factors for SUs
that leads to the optimal performance is discussed. Then, an algorithm is designed to find
the best pricing factors. In the numeral results sections, the performance of the proposed
joint-power and rate-control algorithm is investigated.
In Chapter 3, the multi-user power-control problem is studied for CRNs overall multiple
channels in the dynamic fading environments through a game-theoretical approach. This
research provides the fundamental performance traits of multiple CR users power control
in the present of multiple PUs in fading environments. in fading environments. Unlike
in [16] and [48] where information-theoretical capacity is considered as the objective func-
tion, a more practical and general performance merit in [30] and [26] is considered in this
research: the target SINR of each individual users. It can be used to achieve both a specific
transmission rate (i.e. by using different coding and modulation schemes) in practical and
the information-theoretical capacity (like [16] and [48]) in theory. Due to channel fading,
the target SINR of each CR user can not always be achieved over time as in [30] and [26].
There exists channel outage probability related to both CR and PU transmissions, which is
given by the probability that the SINR falls below a predetermined threshold. As we have
noticed, the formulated problem can be effectively transformed into a convex-optimization
problem by applying the geometric programming [60]. A partial dual-decomposition ap-
proach is applied with layered structure for the constrained game. The properties of the
Nash Equilibrium for the proposed game are thoroughly investigated, and an asynchronous
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distributed power-control algorithm that converges to the Nash Equilibrium is proposed for
the robust implementation
In Chapter 4, for the learning-based power-control problem, it is formulated as an
incomplete-information non-cooperative game in CR networks, where the interference
channel and power strategy information among CR users and the interference channel infor-
mation from CR users to PUs are not available. The power-control game as an interaction
process is modeled by repeat games [61]. The proposed new framework requires CR users
to be “cognitive” enough as in [56] that could decode the link control information from
PUs’ feedback channels. During every stage of the repeated game, each CR user will only
utilized the interference information explored from PUs’ control link and the transmission
rate (by trying certain power control strategy) obtained in the last stage to decide the power
control strategy in this stage, but there is no other information. A reinforcement-learning
approach is designed for the repeated power-control game. The proposed algorithm is suit-
able for a wide scope of practical CR networks. To name a few, the networks scenarios
are: 1) there are no creditable CR users; 2) no infrastructure-supported CR networks; 3)
CR users are not willing to exchange their private information; 4) the large network de-
ployment condition, where channel information exchange does not scales well; 5) fierce
channel varying environments, where channel estimation among CR users might not be
easily updated; 6) PUs’ activity statistics are unknown, e.g. PU’s on-and-off distribution
are unknown, the interference-power constraints of PU might change during the time (e.g.
for mobile PUs).
Similar to the classic game-theoretical approach, the objective of the proposed power-
control game is as follows: on one hand, CR users need to compete for maximizing their
own average utility in the repeated game; on the other hand, each individual CR user need-
s to satisfy the interference power constraints imposed by PUs during the course of the
game. The formulated power-control problem is a constrained repeated game with learn-
ing automaton. The solution of this repeated game is to choose the optimal transmit power
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strategy at each stage that maximizes the average utility and conform the interference pow-
er constraints from PUs in a long run. As a learning automaton, the CR user will adjust
the mixed transmit power strategies according to its own realization of utility and the ex-
plored interference level information at every time step, but no other information. The
power-control game is proved to be asymptotically equivalent to the classic game with
complete information. The properties of existence, diagonal concavity and uniqueness for
the matrix game from the view point of each individual CR user are studied. One of the
best known stochastic models of reinforcement learning, the Bush-Mosteller reinforcement
learning procedure [62], is used to designed the power-control algorithm, and the properties
of convergence and learning rate of the algorithm are analyzed. Finally, the learning-based
power-control algorithm is implemented for simulations.
In Chapter 5, the fundamental scaling-law problem that how the capacity and delay
of CRAHNs scale under the impact of PU activity is analyzed. To make this research of
practical value, the primary network is assumed to be a collection of independently placed
transceiver pairs like the cellular or broadcasting networks, where each transceiver pair is
the licensed spectrum holders. The CRAHN is assumed to be a static ad hoc network as
in [12][13][14] that distributed in the region of the primary network. The performance of
CRAHN is suffered by PU activity, and there is a large space of the scheduling policies
or protocols design for the CRAHNs that leads to the optimal network performance. The
aim of this research is to study under what kind of typical scheduling policy or protocol
the optimal scaling performance of CRAHNs (delay-optimal or throughput-optimal) can
be achieved, and how the primary network deployment impact them.
We assume that there are m primary transmit-receive pairs with on-and-off probabilities
Pon and Poff independently distributed in the region of a CRAHN with n secondary nodes6
and the total bandwidth of W bits per second. Our work differs from the previous studies
in the following critical points.
6the terms ”nodes” and ”users” are used interchangeably in this work.
17
1) It is observed in [35] [36] [37] that the scaling results for CRAHNs have no obvi-
ous relation with the primary network deployment condition when secondary nodes take
advantage of spectrum opportunity in either the frequency or the spatial domain. Howev-
er, by utilizing the time domain spectrum opportunity granted by PU activity, in this work
the scaling performance of CRAHNs are tightly related to the primary network topolo-
gy. Specifically, the primary nodes’ density m, the transmission range and the on-and-off
probabilities Poff (or Pon) are exactly embodied in the scaling results of CRAHNs. These
results are of strong theoretical meanings. They bridge the relation between primary net-
works and CRAHNs, which provides an initial and fundamental understanding for the two
co-existence networks. These results can be served as design guidance of CRAHNs in the
present of PU activity.
2) By considering the PU activity, it is found that the behavior of secondary traffic in
CRAHNs becomes heterogeneous in order to achieve the maximum throughput capaci-
ty. Specifically, this means in classical ad hoc wireless networks [8] [10] and CRAHN-
s [35] [36], there is always traffic load for each source-destination pairs in any specified
time and location. However, when PU activity is involved, we show that the secondary
nodes need to buffer their traffic in order to achieve the maximum throughput capacity. As
a result, there may not always be traffic in CRAHNs at a specific time and location. Based
on this reason, the queuing and transmission delays must be involved into end-to-end delay
computation. In [10] and [36], only the delay arising out of multi-hop operation is con-
sidered for classic wireless ad hoc networks and CRAHNs, which is proportional to the
number of hops between the source and destination nodes.
To study the impact of primary networks’ topology on scaling laws of CRAHNs, we
first consider a typical primary network model: regular dense primary network7, where
primary transmitters are regularly placed with equal transmission range (primary receivers
are therein) in the network region. In this case, the primary network is very dense and the
7Detailed definitions and illustrations are available in Sections III,IV, V.
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primary nodes’ transmission ranges are contingent with each other with high probability,
where the secondary nodes of CRAHNs are nearly all covered within the primary nodes’
transmission ranges. This scenario achieves the worst performance in CRAHNs. Further,
we consider another typical primary network model: regular sparse primary network3,
where primary nodes’ density is sparse and the transmission range is small compared with
the regular dense primary network. In this case, there are always secondary nodes that
are uncovered by primary nodes’ transmission ranges and finding routing paths outside
of these uncovered regions for each secondary node is proved to be feasible. Finally, we
generalize our results to the random dense and sparse primary networks3 where the location
of primary nodes can be randomly distributed.
In Chapter 6, conclusion is drawn for the thesis, where the main results of power control
and capacity scaling of CRNs are presented.
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CHAPTER 2
JOINT-POWER AND RATE-CONTROL GAME VIA PRICING IN










Figure 2.1. System model of the primary and cognitive radio networks.
The system model is a heterogeneous network shown in Fig.2.1. It is a large 3G wireless
cellular primary network that contains a secondary cell. This is a representative scenario of
SUs communications in the spectrum-underlay scheme. The following typical communica-
tion scenario is considered in our discussion: a group of secondary mobile stations or SUs
randomly distributed in the cell are transmitting data to the secondary base station; PUs
are now in the uplink communication, where primary base station measures the interfering
power from SUs. For the other possible scenarios, such as secondary downlink transmis-
sion and/or primary downlink transmission, the principal of secondary transmission making
interference to primary transmission is the same.
Assume that the PUs, denoted as Up, are communicating with the primary base sta-
tion (BS), denoted as BS p. They transmit on a licensed spectrum W. The CRN is a
single-cell spread-spectrum wireless network without the license of the spectrum which
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lies in the communication range of the 3G primary cell (network). There are N SUs that
use the spread-spectrum scheme transmitting data to the secondary BS, denoted as BS s.
We assume all SUs use a spread-spectrum signaling format to share the available spread-
spectrum bandwidth (unit is HZ). In this model, the available spread-spectrum bandwidth
is W, which is exactly the same usable spectrum bands for the licensed PUs. For the uplink
scenario, all the SUs must restrain their transmit powers in order not to cause excessive
interference to the PUs’ BS BS p.
For secondary data communication, there are N active CR links, each of which inter-
feres with the other N − 1 SUs. The SUs are mobile terminals in the cell, and the channel
gain between SU i and BS s is denoted by hi (i = 1, 2, ...,N). The secondary base station
BS s help sending pilot or training singling to estimate the channel gains between SUs and
itself. The SINR of a given SU i as referred in [42] [44], is given by




j=1, j,i h j p j + σ2
, for all i = 1, 2,...,N. (2.1)
The parameters pi and ri are the respective transmit power and transmission rate of the SU
i. These formulas present that all SUs use a spread-spectrum signaling format over the
whole shared band W.
For the impact of SUs’ transmissions on PUs, primary base station BS p can help esti-
mating the channel gains from SUs to itself, measuring the instantaneous total interference
power from all SUs, and dispatching the interference-channel gains and interference-power
threshold to the SUs. The SUs will control their transmit powers based on these informa-
tion. Let gi (i = 1, 2, ...,N) be the channel gain of the ith SU’s transmitter to the PUs’ BS
BS p. Define pi as the transmit power of SU i and p = (p1, p2, ..., pN) as the transmit-power




facilitate the secondary cellular network coexistence with PUs, the interference power from
all SUs should be lower than certain tolerable threshold. In this paper, we use Pth to denote





gi pi ≤ Pth. (2.2)
2.2 Problem Formulation
In the heterogeneous network, as depicted in Fig.1, the behavior of N SUs can be perfectly
modeled as a game: SUs in the secondary cell will compete selfishly to make best use of
network resource (e.g. spectrum/rate and power) provided by PUs. On one hand, each SU
will try its best to achieve a high SINR to guarantee a reliable data transmission; on the
other hand, under certain target SINR requirement, each SU will use a low transmit power
and achieve a high transmission rate to maximize its own utility. In this paper, since we
focus on distributed schemes, we will concentrate on non-cooperative games and assume
each SU behaves rationally to maximize its own utility and avoid inference to PUs.
Let G = [N, {P,R},U (·) }] denote the non-cooperative power- and rate-control game
(NPRG) in the CRN, where N = {1, 2, ...,N} is the set of players. The players in this
game correspond to the N SUs. Pi is the transmit-power strategy space of SU i. Ri is
the transmission-rate strategy space of SUs. Each SU selects a rate ri ∈ Ri and a pow-
er pi ∈ Pi. Here we assume that the strategy space Ri and Pi, i = 1, 2, ...,N for each
SU are compact and convex sets with maximum and minimum constraints. For SU i,











i are the minimal and maximal transmit power and trans-
mission rate imposed on each SU. These values correspond to dynamic ranges labeled in
the SU transmitters, e.g., the maximal transmission rate is related to the maximal order of
coding and modulation schemes the SU can support, the maximal transmit power is the
peak power the SU transmitter can support. Let the rate vector of the SUs system de-
notes as r = (r1, r2, ..., rN) and the power vector as already defined, p = (p1, p2, ..., pN).
The outcome of the game in terms of selected powers and rates of all SUs can be given as
P = P1×P2×...×PN =
{
p|pmini ≤ pi ≤ pmaxi
}
and R = R1×R2×...×RN =
{




The utility function of the SU i is denoted as ui (·), where ui (·) ∈ U (·) is the utility-function
space.
In the non-cooperative power- and rate-control game, each SU seeks to choose its power




ui (p, r) ,∀i ∈ N. (2.3)
2.2.1 Utility Function
The selection of a proper utility function has a great impact on the nature of the NPRG game
in the CRN. For data-oriented, energy-constrained and low-power SUs in the 3G wireless
networks, a good choice for the utility function is the one that measures the number of bits
successfully transmitted per joule of consumed energy. Note that, on one hand, a higher
SINR at the receiver side will result in a lower bit-error-rate and thus increase SU’s utility.
However, on the other hand, to achieve a high SINR level often requires SU to transmit
at a high power which will cause interference to others SUs and PUs. This tradeoff can






Throughput here is the net number of bits that are transmitted without error per unit time.
It can be expressed as follows:
Ti= ri f (γi) , (2.5)
where ri and γi are the transmission rate and SINR for the ith SU. f (γi) is the efficiency
function which represents the frame success rate (FSR) [63]. The meaning of efficiency
function is that if a frame has one or more bit errors, it will be retransmitted. The utility
function in (4) was introduced in [63] [64]. Its unit is bits/joule. It is a widely used model to
characterize the tradeoff between power interference and networks throughput. It has been
used by others in different scenarios (for example, [41], [42], [65]). Note that f (γi) depends
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on the specific data-transmission purposes, such as the modulation scheme, coding, frame
size and fairness issue, etc. In this paper, with the purpose of guaranteeing fairness among
these competitive SUs, we adopt the logarithmic efficiency function as follows to study
the joint-power and rate-control game. As indicated in [66], logarithmic functions can
guarantee proportional-fairness among all the terminals users.
f (γi)= ln (Kγi) . (2.6)
In (6), parameter K can be adjusted to qualify the QoS requirement (we will show this point
in the following discussion immediately). Combining (4), (5) and (6), the utility function





For rate allocation in the problem (3), the SU i need to find a transmission rate r∗i from
the strategy space Ri to maximize its utility function ui. The maximum rate achieves at the
point where the partial derivative of ui with respect to i is zero, ∂ui/∂ri = 0. So the condition






(ln (Kγi)−1)= 0. (2.8)
For power allocation, the SU i needs to find a transmission power p∗i from the strategy
space Pi to maximize its utility function ui ( ∂ui/∂pi = 0). Through calculation we find it’s
the same condition as (8).
The condition for optimal power- and rate-control can be used to obtain the parameter





where γtari is the target SINR for the SU i as its QoS requirement. The value of K in (9) is
calculated when there is no bit error occurs in the transmission. However, in a real network,
this will not be guaranteed. A more practical way of determining K is to set the efficiency
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The advantage of parameter K is that the target SINR can be determined by adjusting
its value. Numerical simulation shows that by changing the value of K, SUs can obtain a
different equilibrium SINR. Thus, with predefined value of K, SUs can play the joint-power
and rate-control game to achieve their target QoS. This means the SINR of each SU must
be equal to or greater than γtari to guarantee a reliable transmission,
γi ≥ γtari . (2.12)
Based on the above discussion, the joint-power and rate-control problem for the SUs







subject to pmini ≤ pi ≤ pmaxi ,∀i ∈ N
rmini ≤ ri ≤ rmaxi ,∀i ∈ N
N∑
i=1
gi pi ≤ Pth
γi ≥ γtari .
(2.13)
The problem (13) has multiple objective functions with non-linear coupled constraints,
which is a constrained game-theoretical problem [67]. It is not easy to approach through
standard optimization theories. Motivated by the concept pricing from the game theo-
ry [45], by introducing it into the utility functions, the net utility for each SU can be
calculated. Note that an efficient pricing mechanism will make a distributive decisions
among SUs that are compatible with the overall system efficiency by not only encouraging
efficient resources share provided by PUs, but also avoiding interference power to PUs.
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Since the interference power from SUs to PUs is a linear combination of the power vector
p = (p1, p2, ..., pN) and the channel-gain vector g = (g1, g2, ..., gN) in (2), we can use the
linear pricing function for this game.
Now, a non-cooperative game with pricing is defined, in which the pricing is used to
characterize the negative effect from each SU to PUs. LetGp= [N, {P,R}, {Up (·) }] represent
the non-cooperative joint-power and rate-control game with interference-power pricing
(NPRGP). upi (·) ∈ Up (·) is the utility function for the NPRGP. The utility function is given
by
upi (p, r) = ui (p, r) − ci (pi) , (2.14)






ci (pi)= ci · pi. (2.15)
The pricing factor ci (ci ≥ 0) should be adjusted such that the self interest of each SU
leads to the overall improvement of the system. Meanwhile, by adjusting ci for each SU,
the overall improved system utility must conform the interference-power constraint in (2).






− ci · pi,∀i ∈ N. (2.16)
Moreover, in the following discussion, it will be shown that regardless of how to choose
the pricing factor ci and whether it meets the interference-power constraint or not, the Nash
equilibrium for the NPRGP always exist.
2.3 Nash equilibrium and Pareto Efficiency
In this section, a power- and rate-control algorithm is derived for the NPRGP game in which
each SU aims to maximizing its net utility. This can be achieved by checking the first-order
condition of the optimal point. For rate allocation, the optimization problem for the SU i
is to find the rate level r∗i from the strategy space Ri to maximize the utility function. For
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power allocation, the optimization problem for the SU i is to find the power level p∗i from
the strategy space Pi to maximize the utility function.
2.3.1 Nash Equilibrium of the NPRGP




























A Nash equilibrium is a stable outcome of a game. At Nash equilibrium point, no user
has any incentive to change its strategy with its own action.







in the NPRGP game Gp= [N, {P,R}, {Up (·) }], ∀i ∈ N for the CRN.
Proof The conditions for the existence of a Nash Equilibrium are given in [42]:
(1) Ri is a nonempty, convex, and compact subset of some Euclidean space RN;
(2) ui (r) is continuous in r, and quasi-concave in ri.
Because each SU is assumed to have a strategy space that is an interval between the
maximum and minimum rates. So the first condition on the strategy space Pi is satisfied.






(ln (Kγi)−1) . (2.18)
Relaxing the upper bound of the rate region to find the possible r∗i , the best response value






To show a function is quasi-concave, it is sufficient to show it is concave, and we use the












In (20), since ∂2upi
/
∂r2i < 0,∀i ∈ N, ui is a concave function of ri. Therefore, it guarantees
the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
In the next, the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of the game Gp is proved.
Proposition 1 : For the NPRGP gameGp, the best response function of the ith user given







where rmaxi is the maximum transmission rate in the ith user’s strategy space Ri.
Proof the best response function ρi (ri) of the ith user is defined as the best action that user
i can take to attain the maximum utility given the other users’ strategy r−i. Formally, user
i’s best response ρi : R−i → Ri is the mapping that assigns to each r−i ∈ R− j the set.
ρi (r−i)=
{







where this set contains only one point [45]. Therefore, r∗i is the unconstrained maximizer
of the target utility function ui.
r∗i = arg maxri∈R+
upi . (2.22)
Moreover, from (20), we have ∂2upi
/
∂r2i < 0,∀ri ∈ R+. It implies that the maximum is
unique. Note that when r∗i is not a feasible solution in the strategy space Ri, that is r
∗
i < Ri,
user i will transmit at the maximum rate rmaxi since the target function is increasing on the
set
{
ri : ri < r∗i
}
. This implies that ri= r∗i is the best response of user i.
The following theorem, proved in [41], guarantees the uniqueness of the Nash equilib-
rium of game Gp.
Theorem 2: If a power-control algorithm with a standard best response function has a
Nash equilibrium, then this Nash equilibrium is unique.
A function is said to be standard, if it satisfies the following three properties:
(1) positivity: f (x) > 0




(3) scalability: for all µ > 1, µf (x) > f (µx)
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where x is a Nash equilibrium and f(x) is the best response function. According to theorem
2, we can prove the following lemma for the transmission-rate control similarly.
Lemma 1 (Uniqueness): In the NPRGP game Gp, the best response transmission-rate
vector, given by
ρ (r) = (ρ1 (r) , ρ2 (r) , ..., ρN (r)),










Proof from theorem 1, we know that there exists a Nash equilibrium r∗. By definition,
the Nash equilibrium has to satisfy r∗ = ρ (r), where ρ (r) = (ρ1 (r) , ρ2 (r) , ..., ρN (r)) is the
best response vector of all users. According to theorem 2, the uniqueness can be proved if
we show that the best response function ρ (r) is standard. The three properties of standard
function can be easily verified for ρ (r). It is shown in [63] that the fixed point r∗ = ρ (r) is
unique for a standard function. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium is unique.
Theorem 3 (Existence and Uniqueness): If ci in the pricing function satisfies ci= c̃i,














transmit power in the NPRGP game Gp= [N, {P,R}, {Up (·) }] for the CRN.
Proof similar to theorem 1, for the proof of the existence of the Nash Equilibrium, the
first condition of theorem 1 about the convexity and compactness of the strategy space Pi
is satisfied obviously, since Pi= [pmini ,pmaxi ] is a compact interval.









Relaxing the upper bound of the rate region to find the possible p∗i , the best response value














ln (Kγi) − 1
p3i
. (2.25)
We know that the probability of correct reception is always less than or equal to 1
(As indicated in (10), Pc ≤ 1 ⇒ ln (Kγi) ≤ 1.) Substitute this into the above (25), we
have ∂2upi
/
∂p2i ≤ 0, which implies that ui is a quasi-concave function of pi optimized on
the convex set Pi. This proves condition 2, which guarantees the existence of a Nash
equilibrium.
Now we prove the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of transmit powers in the NPRGP
game Gp. Set (23) to be zero, we get
c̃i = ri
[




where (1 − ln (Kγi))
/


























> 0 pmini < pi < p
∗
i
= 0 pi = p∗i





Hence, there exists a unique best response strategy p∗i for SU i, if ci= c̃i. In this case, a
unique Nash equilibrium exists.
As in the theorem 1, considering the upper bounds of SUs’ transmit powers, the best











,∀i ∈ N, (2.30)
where
∗
pi = arg max
pi∈R+
upi . It still guarantees the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 2.2. Power vector x Pareto dominates power vector y, and z is Pareto optimal.
The Nash equilibrium discussed in last subsection is the solution to the power- and rate-
control problem where no SU can increase its utility any further unilaterally. Indeed, it is
well known that in general the Nash equilibria are inefficient [45]. A resource-allocation
policy is said to be more efficient (or called ”Pareto dominant”), if it is possible to increase
the utility of some of the terminals without hurting any other terminal. This efficiency is
usually referred as Pareto efficient or Pareto optimal. The definition is as follows.
Definition 2: A vector â = (â1, â2, ..., âN), whether transmit power or transmission rate,
Pareto dominates another vector a, if, for all i ∈ N, ui (â) > ui (a) and for some i ∈ N,
ui (â) > ui (a). Furthermore, a vector ã = (ã1, ã2, ..., ãN) is Pareto Optimal (efficient) if
exists no other vector a in the strategy space such that ui (a) > ui (ã) for all i ∈ N, and
ui (a) > ui (ã) for some i ∈ N.
Fig.2.2 explains the concept of Pareto dominance and Pareto optimality on a generic
utility possibility set. In Fig.2.2, there are two terminals in the game, and their strategy sets
are mapped to the utility possibility set shown in the shaded area. Take the power-control
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game as an example, any power vector that provides a Pareto improvement with respect to
y results in nondecreasing changes in individual utilities, ui (y). From the figure, we can
observe that x is such a power vector. We can also call x as the Pareto-preferred power
vector when compared to y. The distinction of the concepts Pareto dominance and Pareto
optimality is that: Pareto-optimal power allocations do not necessarily Pareto dominate all
other power vectors. For example, compare the utilities obtained by y and z in Fig.2.2,
z is a Pareto-optimal power allocation. However, since u2 (z) < u2 (ỹ), z does not Pareto
dominate y, regardless of the fact that u1 (z) > u1 (ỹ).
In this paper, the power and rate vectors that improve utilities, in the Pareto-sense,
with respect to the Nash equilibrium are referred to as the NPRGP-dominant. The focus
of this section and the next section on pricing is to seek the NPRGP-dominant power and
rate allocations. The following theorem testifies the Pareto optimality (efficiency) of the
equilibrium point (r∗,p∗) in the NPRGP game.
Theorem 4: The Nash equilibrium point (r∗,p∗) of the NPRGP game is Pareto optimal.








: ui (ro) ≥ ui (r∗) ,∀i ∈ N







: ui (po) ≥ ui (p∗) ,∀i ∈ N and u j (po) ≥ u j (p∗), for some j ∈ N, with
po ≥ p∗ component wise.













K · Wr∗i ·
hi pi∑N







Without loss of generality, let roi =ρir
∗






− ci · pi
=roi
ln
K·Wroi · hi pi∑Nj=1, j,i h j p j+σ2

pi
− ci · pi.
(2.32)
In order to find out how upi (r
o) behaves with ρi, it needs to find the first order derivative of
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upi (r






































< 0,∀i ∈ N,
that is, upi (r
o) is decreasing over ρi > 1 for all users. So we conclude that r∗ is a Pareto-
optimal Nash equilibrium point of the NPRGP game.







K·Wri · hi p∗i∑Nj=1, j,i h j p j+σ2

p∗i
2 − ci= 0.
(2.34)
Without loss of generality, let poi=δi p
∗






− ci · poi
=ri
ln
K·Wri · hi poi∑Nj=1, j,i h j p j+σ2

poi
− ci · poi .
(2.35)
To find the first order derivative of upi (p

























= p∗i gi (δip








Note that gi (•) is a strictly decreasing function with respect to pi. So we obtain that












< 0,∀i ∈ N, that is, upi (po) is decreasing over δi > 1 for all users. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that p∗ it is also a Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium point of the NPRGP
game.
According to the above discussion, an asynchronous rate- and power-control algorithm
is proposed which converges to a unique Nash equilibrium point (r∗, p∗) of the game Gp.
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In this algorithm, the SUs update their transmission rates and powers in an asynchronous
manner that requires no strict synchronization among rate and power vectors, which is well
suitable for distributed implementation. Assume that the SU i updates its rate and power at
time instance in the set Ti = {ti1, ti2, ...}, with tik < tik+1, ti0 = 0,∀i ∈ N. Let T = {t1, t2, ...}






TN with tk < tk+1. The NPRGP game generates a sequence of
rates and powers as follows. Let ε be a small number, for example 10−7. A sequence of
rates and powers is obtained as follows:
Algorithm 1: (Asynchronous Rate- and Power-Control (ARPC) Algorithm )
Consider the non-cooperative rate- and power- control game (NPRGP) as given in (16).
1: if ti0 = 0,∀i ∈ N then
2: set p (0) = (p1 (0) , p2 (0) , ..., pN (0)) to any
random vector p,
set r (0) = (r1 (0) , r2 (0) , ..., rN (0)) to any
random vector r.
3: for all i ∈ N, such that tk ∈ Ti, compute
r∗i = arg maxri∈R+
upi (p, r),
4: then set the transmission rate:






5: Given the prior power p (tk−1), compute
p∗i= arg maxpi∈R+
upi (p, r),
6: then set the transmit power:






7: if ∥pi (tk) , pi (tk−1)∥ ≤ ε and ∥ri (tk) , ri (tk−1)∥ ≤ ε,
8: stop.
9: Declare the Nash equilibrium as (ri (tk) , pi (tk)).
10: else,
























Figure 2.3. Feasible transmit power region for SUs in the CRN.
2.4 Power Pricing Factor for NPRGP
2.4.1 Feasible Power Pricing Factor
In this subsection, the process of how to find the feasible power pricing factors for SUs in
the NPRGP that conforms the interference-power constraint (2) is discussed. To illustrate
this process clearly, in this subsection, the two-SUs case is first illustrated with the referred
graph, Fig.2.3 and Fig.2.4. For the multi-SUs case, it is the same idea as the two-SUs case,
and the corresponding algorithm for general N-SUs is designed in subsection 2.4.1.
At first, consider an extreme case that SUs’ transmit powers achieve the interference-











gi poi= Pth. (2.37)
We call the set of power vectors that satisfy (37) as the interference-power boundary for
SUs. Every power vector beyonds this boundary will violate (2). Geometrically, (37)
represents a super plane in the Euclidean space RN with poi , i = 1, 2, ...,N as variables. For
the two SUs case, it is degraded to a straight line g1 p1 + g2 p2 = Pth in R2 as in Fig.2.3.





























Figure 2.4. Feasible region of power pricing for SUs in the CRN.
SUs, which is the region described by inequality (2). Moreover, pmaxi and p
min
i are the upper
bound and the lower bound for all SU i = 1, 2, ...,N in Fig.2.3.
















tionship is connected by (26). By assigning different power-pricing factors, SUs will obtain
different Nash equilibria of transmit power. Since increasing transmit power of one SU will
also cause interference to other N−1 SUs and affect their utility, the Nash equilibrium point
of transmit power for each SU can not exceed certain threshold, and there must be a upper
boundary1. In Euclidean space R2 , it is a two-dimensional curve in Fig.2.3. We call this
boundary curve as Nash equilibrium power curve.
Until now, the feasible power region of SUs is obtained. The feasible power region
satisfies that: each SU transmits its data on the Nash equilibrium point, while do not cause
excessive interference to PUs. In geometry, this region is the intersection of Nash equilibri-
um, interference-power constraint, and maximum and minimum transmit-power curves in
1Note that the detailed algorithm that investigates this process will be available in the Numerical Results
Section.
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the first quadrant. The feasible power region is labeled in Fig.2.3.
Now, it is necessary to find the feasible power-pricing vectors that ensure all SUs trans-
mit powers in the feasible power region. This process is obvious: we only need to map the
power curves as in Fig.2.3 into pricing curves according to (26) and find the corresponding
pricing region. For the same example in R2, the feasible pricing region is labeled in Fig.2.4.








in Fig.2.4 denotes the cor-
responding pricing vector when transmit-power vector reaches the interference-power con-
straint in Fig.2.3. Similarly, we have the Nash equilibrium pricing curve shown in Fig.2.4.
Now, we have set up the one-to-one mapping between Fig.2.3 and Fig.2.4. Mathematical-
ly, this mapping is connected by (26), where vector pi decreases when ci increases, and
visa versa. To restrict the transmit powers of SUs that guarantee the interference-power
constraint, it requires to choose high pricing factor for the SUs. Accordingly, we can seek
the best interference-power pricing from the feasible pricing region (shown in Fig.2.4) that
results in the optimal equilibrium rates and powers of the NPRGP. The corresponding al-
gorithm for the general N-SUs case is designed in the following subsection.
2.4.2 Seeking for the best interference-power pricing
The equilibrium rates and powers of the NPRGP given in (16) are obtained by Algorithm
1. To obtain the best interference-power pricing for each SU that maximizes the overall
networking utility, at first, we get the equilibrium rates and powers in the NPRGP with no
pricing (ci = 0,∀i ∈ N). This is equivalent to play the NPRG given in (3). The equilibrium
rates and powers in the NPRG are obtained by solving γi = γtari for each user i. Once
the equilibrium without pricing is obtained, the NPRG is played again after increasing
the pricing factor ci by a positive value ∆ci. Accordingly, algorithm 1 returns a set of
rates and powers at the equilibrium with the incremented pricing factors. If the utilities at
this new equilibrium are improved compared with previous instance and the interference-
power constraint is conformed, the pricing factors will be increased and the procedure will
be repeated again and again. Let this process continue until an increase in ci results in
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at least one SU’s utility is worse than the previous equilibrium values or the interference-
power constraint is violated. Declare the last value of ci (Pareto optimal 2) to be the best
pricing factor, cbesti . The process of finding c
best
i can be summarized as an algorithm in the
following.
Algorithm 2:(Best pricing factor for the NPRGP)
1: set ci = 0, announce ci to all SUs.
2: get ui,∀i ∈ N, at equilibrium powers and rates.
3: set increment ci£ = ci + ∆ci to satisfy interference-power
constraint, and update ci to SU i ∀i ∈ N.
4: if ucii 6 u
ci+∆ci
i ,∀i ∈ N.
5: then go to step 2.
6: else
7:stop, declare cbesti = ci,∀i ∈ N.
The Algorithm 2 can be implemented by heuristic search, which searches one SU’s
pricing factor and let other ones be fixed. At the initial stage, the step size of each ci can
be set very large until step 3 and step 4 in Algorithm 2 are violated. Then, adjust each ci
with small step size to find the optimal values of the pricing factors. In the real network
implementation, the information obtained in the searching processes can be accumulated
to reduce the implementation complexity.
2.5 Numerical Results
2.5.1 Simulation Model
Consider a 3G cellular primary network with a radius of 3km, where BS Bp is in the center
of the circle. The secondary cell with radius 500m located 500m south (the central of the
secondary cell is 1000m) to Bp as shown in Fig.2.1. There are 10 SUs in the secondary
cell sharing the spread-spectrum bandwidth W, 3.84 ∗ 106 Hz (chip rate). The SUs are
assumed at distances d = [50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300, 350, 400, 450, 500] m from the
2Since in this case SUs’ utilities can not increase cooperatively for any set of SUs.
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secondary base station BS s. The instant locations of the 10 SUs are described in Fig.2.1:
SUs are distributed uniformly around BS s, and their distances d decrease gradually in the
clockwise direction. The AWGN power σ2 at the receiver of each SUs is 10−15 W/Hz. The
maximum and the minimum power-constraints for each SUs is 0.2 Watts and 10−5 Watts.
The maximum and the minimum rate-constraints for each SU is 96 kbps and 0 kbps. There
is no forward error correction, and the channel gains of secondary data communication use
the simple path loss model hi = K/d4i , where di is the distance between SU i and BS s. For
the interference path-loss model gi from SU i to BS p, we use the same model as hi. PUs are
randomly located around the Bp, and their tolerable interference power at receiver side (Bp
in Fig.2.1) is assumed to be −118dBm. The noise power spectrum density at the receiver
side of BS p, same as SU, is −120dBm. We consider the required target SINR γtari for each
SU to be 12.42 (equal to the equilibrium SINR obtained by the algorithm in [42]). Then
we calculate the value of parameter ’K’ using (9), where K = 0.21886.



































Figure 2.5. Convergence of transmit powers of all SUs.
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Figure 2.6. Convergence of transmission rates of all SUs.
2.5.2 Performance Analysis
The algorithms 1 and 2 are implemented to find the Nash Equilibrium of transmit pow-
er, transmission rate and best pricing factor for each SU, the corresponding simulation-
s are shown in Fig.2.5-2.10. The algorithms are implemented for the following games:
non-cooperative joint-power and rate-control game with pricing (NPRGP), non-cooperative
joint-power and rate-control game (NPRG), non-cooperative power-control game with pric-
ing (NPGP). The NPRGP is the central problem of this paper, which is formulated in (16)
and fully implemented by algorithm 1 and 2. The NPRG is the problem formulated in (3),
where pricing for interference power is omitted. For the algorithmic implementation of the
NPRG, we only need to set all the ci,∀i ∈ N, equal to zero. The NPGP is the conventional
power control problem in CRNs under interference-power constraint, like [10][11][13-18],
where only power control is considered. In this case, the transmission rate for each SU is
fixed, and it is the average value of transmission rates obtained in the NPRGP (It is shown
in Fig. 2.9). For the algorithmic implementation of the NPGP, we only need to omit the
transmission-rate control in algorithm 1, and set them fixed values; the algorithm 2 for the
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NPGP is the same.
In Fig.2.5, it is found that the transmit powers of SUs take around 300 iterations to
converge when we set ε = 10−7. In our simulation, a typical iteration of algorithm 1 need
time Θ(1ns)3. The total convergence time for algorithm 1 is Θ(1µs). For the message
exchange and utility comparison between SUs, in our experiments, the time consumed
based on the heuristic-search approach, on the average, is Θ(400ms). We believe that the
implementation delay of these algorithms is tolerable for a typical cellular communication
cycle [69]. In Fig.2.5, it is found that the transmission rates converge more ”smooth” and
much ”faster” than transmit powers in Fig.2.5. This is because there are no extra constraints
that affect the convergence of transmission rates.
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Figure 2.7. Best pricing factors of SUs by the algorithm 2.
In Fig.2.7, the best pricing factors obtained by algorithm 2 under interference-power
constraints Pth = −118dBm and Pth = −90dBm are shown. In the light interference-power
constraint condition Pth = −118dBm, it is observed that the nearer the SU to the base station
BS s, the larger the pricing factor. At this time, the impact of inter-SUs interference on SUs’
3Here we use the Knuth’s notation ”the big-theta” [68] in algorithm analysis. f (x) = Θ(g(x)) means you
can say that f (x) is the same order of g(x).
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utilities is the leading part, compared with the impact of interference-power constraint from
PUs. Moreover, when a SU is near to BS s, more interference will be caused to other SUs, so
the penalty of the interference power on this SU will be larger. This means the price for the
SU’s data transmission will be larger. In the strong interference-power constraint condition
Pth = −90dBm, it is observed that the pricing factors are larger, when SUs are more near to
PUs. At this time, SUs are impacted a lot by PUs’ interference-power constraint besides the
inter-SUs interference. Moreover, the pricing factors are investigated in the special network
scenario where the SUs are of equal distance 50m to the secondary base station BS s. To
ease the comparison, the results are shown in Fig.2.7, where now the distance between SUs
and BS s are d = [50, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50, 50]m. By simply checking these pricing
factors, it is found that their difference approximately obey the rule in (38). At this time,
the utility difference among SUs are only affected by the difference of their channel gains
to PUs.







































Figure 2.8. Comparison of Nash equilibrium of transmit powers.
In Fig.2.8, the Nash equilibrium powers of SUs obtained by algorithm 1 and 2 are
compared. At First, with nearly the same transmission rate for each SU shown in Fig.2.9,
the transmit power for the NPRGP is greatly reduced when compared with the NPRG in
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(3) without price. This conforms our statement that price is an effective tool to reduce
interference and lead the system to work in an efficient operating point. Second, when
considering the conventional power-control problem for SUs with interference-power pric-
ing, the NPGP, it is observed that the transmit powers for SUs systems are larger than the
transmit powers in the NPRGP. This means that under the same transmission rates for all
SUs, the NPRGP use less transmit powers than the NPGP, which conforms the central point
in this research: joint-power and rate-control can achieve better radio-resource utilization
than the only power control in CRNs.



































Figure 2.9. Comparison of Nash equilibrium of transmission rates.
In Fig.2.9, the Nash equilibrium rates of SUs are compared. The obtained transmission
rate of each SU for the NPRGP and the NPRG is nearly the same. In these games, each
SU is allocated optimal transmission rate according to the distance between the SU and
BS p. For the NPGP, every SU is allocated the same transmission rate to guarantee its target
SINR. The overall performance for SUs in the NPGP is inferior to the NPRGP and the
NPRG. Notice that the transmission rates of the NPGP are greater than that of the NPRGP
and the NPRG, when the distance between SUs and BS p is greater than 250m. However,
the corresponding transmit power for each SU, in Fig.2.8, is largely increased.
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Figure 2.10. Comparison of SUs’ utilities.
In Fig.2.10, the utilities or satisfactions experienced by SUs of the proposed games, i.e.,
NPRGP, NPRG and NPGP, are compared. As indicated in Fig.2.8, by introducing price into
the NPRGP, the transmit powers can be largely reduced when achieving nearly the same
transmission rates as in the NPRG. in Fig.2.10, with the best pricing factor for each SU,
the utility of each SU can be greatly improved. Moreover, the utilities of the NPRGP are
computed under the strong interference-power constraint condition Pth = −118dBm. It is
observed that the utilities are less than the utilities in the light interference-power constraint
condition Pth = −90dBm, and the SUs that are near to PUs suffer more utilities decrease
than the SUs that are far from PUs.
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CHAPTER 3
ASYNCHRONOUS POWER-CONTROL GAME WITH CHANNEL
OUTAGE CONSTRAINTS IN COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORKS
3.1 System Model
Figure 3.1. N CR users and M PUs sharing a single-channel case.
Consider the scenario shown in Fig.3.1, in which there are a set of N := {1, ...,N}
CR transceiver pairs allowed to share a set of K := {1, ...,K} channels used for a primary
network. There areM := {1, ..., M} primary transceiver pairs co-located with the CR users
having priority in using these K channels. The behavior of the primary and CRNs are as
follows: CR users are playing the power-control game under the influence from primary
system; PU pairs transmit with fixed power for the duration of this game, where their
transmission are suffered by CR users’ transmit power and dynamic fading environments.
Thus, we can denote the transmit power of CR user n and PU m on channel k as pkn and p̄
k
m,
respectively. We assume the Rayleigh fading in the model. Let gki j denote the slow-varying
channel gain between i’s CR or PU transmitter and j’s CR or PU receiver, which is assumed
to be stationary and do not change significantly over the time scale of this analysis. Let f ki j
denote the fast time-scale Rayleigh-fading-channel gain between i’s CR or PU transmitter
and j’s CR or PU receiver, which is assumed to be a ”block” fading model [69] (static over
individual data frames but varying from one frame to another) with unit mean independent
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exponentially distributed random variable. The received SINR of any CR user or PU l on


























where σ2k is the noise power, and p
k = {pkn;∀n ∈ N} is the power vector of all CR users’
transmit powers on channel k. Note that {p̄km,∀m ∈ M} is a constant value. In a Rayleigh-
fading environment, γkl (p
k) is a random variable with a very complex distribution [70], since
it is the ratio of an exponential random variable to a sum of exponential random variables.
The careful choice of γ̄kl establishes the intended QoS request of each user on a specific
channel. The QoS requested is provided when the SINR exceeds a given threshold γ̄kl . For
the flat block-fading channels, the proportion of time that certain target SINR threshold γ̄kl
is not satisfied is defined as the outage probability of user l on channel k [69]. The outage




of lth user (CR users or PUs) on channel k can be found
in [70] of a closed form expression:
Qkl (p
k


















































). It is the outage
probability of primary receiver in Rayleigh-fading channel with exponential distribution
f kl and unit mean in the absence of other PUs or CR users. Therefore, the above equation
indicates the outage probability of a single user in the present of multiple PUs and/or CR
users. Accordingly, the aim of each CR user n is to transmit with the target data rate
R̄kn (it is one-to-one correspondent to γ̄
k
n under any fixed modulated schemes or under the
information-theoretical capacity scheme) on channel k with the specified channel outage ξkn





−n) ≤ ξkn,∀n ∈ N . (3.3)
Inequality (3.3) denotes the outage constraint of the CR user n on the channel k that guaran-
tees its requested QoS. Similarly, we have the definition for each PU’s target data rate R̄km,
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and the outage constraints of each PU m on each channel k, which requests transmit-power





−n) ≤ ξkm,∀m ∈ M. (3.4)
Notice that there exists the co-channel interference among CR users and PUs. The ”cou-
pled” effects among them impact the QoS performance of all PUs and CR users. Therefore,
this coupled power-control problem can be modulated as a non-cooperative game as fol-
lows:
GMPCF = {N , {Ψn}n∈N , {Xn}n∈N }. (3.5)





where αn is the weighting factor on power-allocation vector pn = (p1n, p2n, ..., pKn ) over all the
K channels. Xn is each CR user’s strategy that are coupled with other users’ strategies and
can be expressed as:
Xn(p−n) = {pn ∈ ΩPn |Qkn(pkn,pk−n) ≤ ξkn; Qkm(pkn,pk−n) ≤ ξkm,∀n ∈ N ,∀m ∈ M} (3.7)
where ΩPn= {pi ∈ RK |
∑
k∈K pkn ≤ Pmaxn ; plkn ≤ pkn ≤ pukn,∀k ∈ K,∀n ∈ N} is CR user n’s





the upper and lower bound of CR user n’s transmit power on channel k. The power vector
p−n = (p1,p2, ..., pn−1,pn+1, ..., , pN) denotes the transmit power of all the other CR users.
From (3.7), the whole strategy space of the GMPCF can be expressed as:
X = {(p1,p2, ..., pN) ∈ ΩP1×, ...,×ΩPN|Qkn(pkn,pk−n) ≤ ξkn;
Qkm(p
k
n,pk−n) ≤ ξkm,∀m ∈ M,∀k ∈ K .}
(3.8)











N) is obtained by the following equation:
p∗n = arg minpn∈Xn(p−n)
Ψn(pn),∀n ∈ N (3.10)
Definition 1 A target QoS profile for both CR users and PUs ({γ̄kl (pk}, ξkn, ξkm),∀n ∈
N ,∀m ∈ M is feasible, if there exist a transmit-power vector (p1, ..., pN) such that X =
{(p1,p2, ...,pN) ∈ ΩP1×, ...,×ΩPN|Qkn(pkn,pk−n) ≤ ξkn; Qkm(pkn,pk−n) ≤ ξkm,∀m ∈ M,∀k ∈ K}.
3.2 Properties of the Power-Control Game
In this section, the properties of the proposed power-control game are investigated. To view












∀m ∈ M,∀k ∈ K .
(3.11)





























Similarly, the second constraint of the problem (3.11) is expanded as
N∏
n=1





























The feasible power vectors in the constraints (3.12) and (3.13) are non-convex. Thus,
the constrained game (3.11) is nonlinear and non-convex. The geometric programming [60]
can be applied to solve this problem (3.11). However, generally geometric programs are
not convex optimization problems, and they can be transformed into convex problems by
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adopting logarithmic change of variables: let p̃kn = log(p
k
n). Therefore, the transformed




































+ log(1 − ξkn) ≤ 0;∑N








p̃n ∈ ΩP̃;∀m ∈ M,∀k ∈ K .
(3.14)
Now, we investigate the properties of problem (3.14). We denote Q̃kn(p̃
k
n, p̃k−n) and Q̃kn(p̃kn, p̃k−n)
as the function notations of the first and second constraints on CR users and PUs in problem
(3.14). The following two lemmas indicate the properties of the constraints of CR users and
PUs in (3.14), respectively.
Lemma 1 The CR user outage-constraint function Q̃kn(p̃kn, p̃k−n) in (3.14) have the follow-
ing properties.
• P.1 Q̃kn is strictly decreasing in p̃kn
• P.2 Q̃kn is convex in p̃kn
• P.3 Q̃kn is strictly increasing and convex in p̃ki , ∀i , n, i ∈ N
• P.4 The Hessian matrix of Q̃kn with respect to power vector pk is positively defined.
Proof To prove the properties of P.1 ∼ P.4, it only needs to check the first and second















































































































2 > 0. (3.18)





















































































































































For the first inequality in the above equation, it is because of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequal-





















is a strictly convex function of vector p̃k, and its
Hessian is positive definite.
Lemma 2 The PU outage-constraint function Q̃km(p̃km, p̃k−n) in (3.14) have the following
properties.
• P.1 Q̃km is strictly increasing in p̃kn
• P.2 Q̃km is convex in p̃kn
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• P.3 The Hessian matrix of Q̃km with respect to power vector pk is a diagonal matrix
and is positively defined.
Proof Similarly, to prove the properties of P.1 ∼ P.3, we only need to check the first and





























diagonal matrix of the following form:

















is a strictly convex function of vector p̃k.
Theorem 1 [Uniqueness] If the target QoS profile is feasible, the transformed power-
control game in (3.14) admits a unique inner Nash equilibrium solution.
Proof The proof of this theorem is similar to the one of Theorem 2 in [26]. It is briefly
outlined here for completeness. Let the pk = (p1, ..., pN) stratifies the feasibility of target
QoS. Clearly, pk is closed and bounded onΩP, hence it is compact. Furthermore, according
to lemma 1 and 2, the Hessian matrix of constraints Q̃kn and Q̃
k
m are all positive defined with
respect to power vector pk, which indicate strict convexity of the constrained game (3.14).
By a standard theorem of game theory (Theorem 4.4 p.176 in [71]), the power-control game
admits a unique Nash equilibrium.
3.3 Dual Decomposition with Layered Structures
The optimization problem in (3.14) is a game-theoretical problem with coupled constraints.
Thus, distributive algorithms that converge to the N.E for the GMPCF is difficult, since the
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satisfaction of both QoS of CR users and PUs constraints requires the coordination among
CR users. Therefore, a partial dual decomposition method for constrained game is used to
























































where λn denotes the dual price for the requested QoS of CR user n. Define the 1 × N
dual price vector λN := {λ1, ..., λN}. For the PUs system, define the 1 × MK dual vector
µM := {µ1, ...,µM}, where each 1 × K vector µm := {µ1m, ..., µkm},∀m ∈ M. It represents
the set of dual prices for the PU m suffering from the interference power of the CR users
over the K channels, which are known to all the CR users at the same time. The following
function defines the parameterized power control objective function for ∀n ∈ N
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1p np pN
Figure 3.2. Dual decomposition with layered structures.
1) The multi-channel power control sub-game among all the CR users under the QoS
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requirement of both CR users and PUs, given that the dual price vector λ and µ:
GMPCF−S = {N ,{sn}n∈N , {Πn(p̃n, p̃−n, λn, µ)}n∈N } (3.21)
2) The sub-gradient updating of each CR user’s dual price for the requested QoS given
the equilibrium transmit-power vectors (p∗1 (λ, µ) , ..., p
∗
N (λ, µ)) for the sub-game GMPCF−S (λ, µ):



































3) The sub-gradient updating of each PU’s dual price for the requested QoS given the
interference equilibrium transmit-power vectors (p∗1 (λ, µ) , ..., p
∗













where ς1 and ς2 denote the updating step sizes.




Ln(p∗n (λ, µ) , p
∗
−n (λ, µ) , λn, µ) (3.24)
by using the sub-gradient method. Since the sub-gradient updating of λn and µkm are adjusted











































,∀m ∈ M, k ∈ K .
The layered structure is of a Stackelberg model as shown in Fig.3.2: each CR user n
announces its QoS outage constraint dual price λn and each PU m announces its QoS outage
constraint dual price µkm to the multichannel power-control subproblem GMPCF−S among all
CR users.
From theorem 1, the primary problem in (3.14) is convex, and the sub-gradient ap-
proaches can be always used without having performance loss. Different from GMPCF , the
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sub-game GMPCF−S is only played within each CR user’s power budget range p̃n ∈ ΩP̃, and
the power-control problem can be represented as follows:
min
p̃n∈ΩP̃n
Πn(p̃n, p̃−n, λn, µ) (3.25)
The lagrangian (3.20) of each CR user in GMPCF−S contains two interference parts: one
is the interference caused by the self power transmission; the other part is the interference
caused from other CR users and PUs to it. Specifically, in the first part, each CR user need
to adjust its transmit power that minimizes the desired transmit power under the target QoS
and restricts its interference to all the PUs; in the second part, each CR user should transmit
an adequate power to combat the Rayleigh-fading environments, and the interference from
PUs and other CR users to guarantee its requested QoS.
3.4 Distributed Power-Control Algorithm
In this section, we design a distributed algorithm to find the Nash Equilibrium for GMPCF .
To obtain the global optimum of this problem, the gradient-descent method is applied intu-
itively. The gradient of Πn(p̃n, p̃−n, λn, µ) with respect to p̃kn is given by
v
S 1vS  



























update update update update




















Figure 3.3. Asynchronous power control and dual-price updating process in ∆T .











































In terms of the pricing interpretation of each term, it motivates the following asynchronous
distributed algorithm, in which node pairs iteratively update their price announcements and
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transmit-power decisions in an attempt to achieve the global optimum. For the layered
structure of the power-updating algorithm, we denote ∆T as the long time updating interval
for the dual price of both the PUs’ and CR users’ requested QoS. Let ∆t = ∆T/C denote
the short time-updating interval for the power-updating of the sub-game GMPCF−S , where C
is a constant and large enough such that for any given dual prices, (p̃∗1 (λ, µ) , ..., p̃
∗
N (λ, µ))
of GMPCF−S can be completed before the end of ∆T . The asynchronous power-control
algorithm for sub-game GMPCF−S requires no strict time synchronization among multiple
CR users within the long time duration of [S v, S v+1], which is more robust and suitable for
the implementation in dynamic fading environments. In this case, each CR user can use
other CR users’ transmit power and channel information either before or after the current
time slice within its power-updating process. As a simple illustration, the power-updating
process of the CR user N is shown in Fig.3.3. The corresponding distributed power-control
algorithm (A1) is given as follows.
Algorithm (A1): (Asynchronous Distributed Power-Control Algorithm)
Initialization:
At time t0,0 = S 0 = 0, each CR user n ∈ N chooses the initial p̃n(t0,0) ∈ ΩPn and set
λi(S v) > 0. Each PU m ∈ M initializes µkm(S 0) > 0,∀k ∈ K .
Iterative Process:
(I)Sub-gradient Decent Updating for Power-Control Game After receiving the dual
prices λi(S v) and (µ1(S 0), ..., µM(S 0)), each CR user n will play the sub-game GMPCF−S (λ(S v), µ(S v))
during the vth long updating interval. Specifically, during the vth ∆T , each user n ∈ N up-
dates p̃n at the beginning of the cth short updating time tv,c and initialize p̃kn(tv,0) = p̃
k
n(tv−1,c).
The beginning of updating time tv,c for CR users do not need to be synchronized, but the
end tv,C should be terminated before S v+1.
p̃kn(tv,w) = p̃
k
n(tv,w−1) + ν∇Πn(p̃n, p̃−n, λn(S v), µ(S v))
where λn(tv,c) is the optimal dual price for CR user n’s power budget constraint (
∑
k∈K pkn ≤
Pmaxn ) at each tv,c.
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(II)Sub-gradient Decent Updating for Dual Prices:
Each CR user n ∈ N updates λn at the end of the vth long updating time as follows:













































(II) Set v = v + 1 and Repeat Steps (a), (b), (c) until Convergence
3.5 Convergence
In this section, the convergence of the proposed asynchronous algorithm is presented. Ac-
cording to [72], the totally asynchronous iteration allows CR users to perform power ad-
justments faster and execute more iterations than the synchronous iteration. It updates CR
users’ outdated information including the reception failures resulted from fading environ-
ments.
For example, define τ jn(tv,c) as the most recent time that p̃n is known to CR user j at time
tv,c. Then the CR user j adjusts its transmit power at time tv,c using the power vector





where p̃n(tv,c) is the transmitted power of CR user n at time tv,c. Let T n(tv,c) be the time
sets at which p̃n(tv,c) is updated. Denote the update algorithm as Tn(·). Given the sets
T 1, ..., T n, ..., T N , the totally asynchronous standard algorithm model can be defined as
p̃n(tv,c+1) =

Tn( p̃(τn(tv,c))), t ∈ T n;
p̃n(tv,c), otherwise.
(3.27)
The sets T j are infinite at a given long-time interval v, and given any tv,0, there exists
tv,1 such that τ
j
n(tv,c ≥ tv,0), for all tv,c ≥ tv,1.
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The convergence of the proposed power-control algorithm can be proved by the Asyn-
chronous Convergence Theorem in [72] as stated in the following theorem 2.
Theorem 2 If there is a sequence of nonempty sets {P(i)} with {P(i + 1)} ⊂ {P(n)} and
T (p̃) = (Tn(p̃)), n ∈ N for all i satisfying the following two conditions:
(1) Synchronous Convergence Condition: for all i and p̃ ∈ P(n),T (p̃) ∈ P(i + 1). If
qi is a sequence such that qi ∈ P(i), p̃ is a fixed point of T (p̃).
(2) Box Condition: For every i, there exist sets Pn(i) ∈ P, such that P = P1(i)×P2(i)×
... × PN(i).
For the proposed algorithm, T (p̃) is depicted as (3.26). Since the proposed game (The-
orem 1) has convexity, the fixed point p̃⋆ of T (p̃), i.e. p̃⋆ = T (p̃⋆) is also the global
optimum of the game. The challenges in applying Theorem 2 are to identify a suitable
sequence of sets {P(i)}. The concept of contraction mapping [72] plays a key role in the
proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 3 [Convergence] For the sufficient small ν, the proposed distributed algorith-
m converges to the global optimum p̃⋆ when the power-control algorithm operated asyn-
chronously for the sub-game GMPCF−S .
Proof To prove this theorem, it is enough to prove the proposed algorithm T (p̃) is a special
type of pseudo-contraction mapping [72], that is∥∥∥T (p̃) − p̃⋆∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥p̃ − p̃⋆∥∥∥ . (3.28)
where ∥ · ∥ is certain norm, and ρ ∈ [0, 1) is a constant. By choosing the sets of sequence
{P(i)} in theorem 2 as
P(i) = {p̃|
∥∥∥p̃ − p̃⋆∥∥∥ ≤ ρn ∥∥∥p̃(0) − p̃⋆∥∥∥}. (3.29)
It follows the condition (1) and (2) in theorem 2. Therefore, all we need is to prove T (p̃)
is a special type of pseudo-contraction mapping. For the clear description of this point, we
first prove the conclusion for the single-channel case, K = 1, where the channel subscripts
k are omitted, and the conclusion is extended to K > 1 later.
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Let f (p̃) = ∇Πn(p̃n, p̃−n, λn, µ), and ∇i fn(p̃) denotes the partial derivatives of compo-
nents fn with respect to the component of p̃i. Accordingly, we have

















































Therefore, 1 − ν∇n fn( p̃) > 0 for ν is small enough. Similarly, we have∑
i,n

















|1 − v∇n fn( p̃)| +
∑
i,n
|v∇i fn( p̃)| < ε (3.32)
where



































Since all the terms in {·} are positive, there must exist a ν small enough such that ε < 1, i.e.
the matrix of ∇ f ( p̃) is diagonal dominant. From [72], we know the proposed algorithm is
a pseudo-contraction mapping when K = 1.
For K > 1, the scalar p̃n is replaced by vector p̃n = ( p̃kn, k ∈ K), so the ∇n fn( p̃) denotes
a matrix of dimension K ∗ K. Now, the | · | is replaced by the spectrum norm. Similarly,
the contraction mapping can be proved by the diagonal-dominance condition. The detailed
proof for multiple channels cases is omitted here for brevity.
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Figure 3.4. Convergence process of outage probability and transmit powers for CR users and/or PUs.
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3.6 Simulation Results
We consider a network where PUs and CR users are within a 1km-radius circle in the sim-
ulation. The location of both PUs and CR users follows the uniform distribution. We
investigate the performance of the power-control algorithm of CR users, and channel out-
ages of both PUs and CR users over six shared spectrum bands. The weighting factor
αn = 1,∀n ∈ N . The channel gain of ith user is determined by the Rayleigh fast-fading
and a log-normal shadowing path-loss model, given by gi = (8/di)4 · Y−1σ · fi, where di is
the distance-dependent with loss exponent 4, Log(Yσ) is a zero-mean Gaussian random
variable with a standard deviation of σ = 8, and fi is a random variable with Rayleigh dis-
tribution. The variable fi models the fast-fading channel. We generate the random variable
fi at each time (or iteration) step, and Yσ very 30 time steps. Furthermore, an AWGN noise
power is chosen to be σ2 = 10−13, corresponding to an approximate 1MHZ bandwidth.
We set the default simulation parameters as follows: there are three types of CR users
and PUs, each having the typical outage-probability and SINR-threshold pairs at receiv-
er side (5%, 12dB), (10%, 10dB) , (20%, 8dB) and (1%, 10dB), (5%, 8dB) , (10%, 6dB),
respectively. Each PU’s transmit power is assumed to be 80dBm (i.e. the typical trans-
mission power of primary base (FM radio) stations). Typically, we consider 30 CR users
and 30 PUs, and both of them have 10 users of each type. Our proposed asynchronous
distributed power-control algorithm 1 is implemented in Matlab, and it iterates to declare
the convergence until successive iterations yield an average per-user power within 1%.
Fig. 3.4. (1) (2) show the convergence process of the outage probability for CR users
and PUs, respectively. When comparing the convergence process of CR users and PUs,
the PUs’ outage probability converges smoother than the CR users. In Fig.3.4. (3), (4),
the convergence process of the transmit power is shown for the CR users with different
type and number of users. We consider 100 independent simulations for each type of
users, and obtain the averaged values of transmit power for each type of users. Fig.3.4.
(3) represents that the lower the channel-outage constraints, the higher the transmit power
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Figure 3.5. SINR vs outage probability for CR users and PUs.
required for each type of CR users. In addition, we can observe the fact that increasing
number of users results in the transmit power increment in Fig.3.4. (4). All the results
confirm our theoretical predictions. Moreover, we could see that the transmit power and
outage probability of each CR and/or PU do not monotonically converge to the equilibrium
points. The rationale on this point is, in the present of Rayleigh fading, the channel gain is
varying with time, which affects the choice of power strategies in the power-control game.



















































































Figure 3.6. Percentage of meeting outage-probability constraints.
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Fig.3.5 shows the outage-probability constraints with respect to the different target S-
INRs for both CR users and PUs. The target SINR is changing from 12 (10dB) to 300
(24dB). As the target SINR increases, the outage probability always increases at the same
time. In this figure, both theoretical results and the simulation results of the average outage
probability are shown for CR users. Further quantification can be performed to the average
deviation of specified outage probability and the simulated outage probability in Fig.3.6.
Furthermore, we can observe the enhancement of the constraints’ deviation, when the size
of the users (PUs or CR users) is scaled upwards.
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CHAPTER 4
LEARNING THROUGH REINFORCEMENT FOR REPEATED
POWER-CONTROL GAME IN COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORKS
4.1 Repeated Constrained Power-Control Game
4.1.1 System Model as learning Automaton
The system model is illustrated in Fig. 1, where there are N CR transceiver pairs playing the
repeated power-control game with PUs over time. There are M PUs in the network region.
Each PU’s behavior might be changing with time, where its activity is distributed according
to some probability that is not known to CR users. The interference CSI condition among
CR users and the CSI from each CR user to each PU are unknown, and they might be
changing with time. We consider a the synchronous slotted time structured spectrum access
for PUs and CR users as in [56] [55] during the long time repeated game. At each time
slot t, each CR transmitter forwards its data with transmit power strategies from Ptk ∈ Pk
∆
=
{Pk(1),Pk(2), ...,Pk(Nk)}, which is the action set of the learning automaton of user k; and
Nk is the number of total actions of the CR user k. The transmit power space for the CRN is
denoted as P =
∏N
k=1 Pk. CR users can utilize its feedback channel (Rx-to-Tx) to estimate




kk) as the CSI of the CR user k at time t, where b
t
l = 0
(btl = 1) indicates the inactive (active) of PU l’s transmission at time t, and G
t
kk denotes the
channel gain of the CR user k. Since we assume the blind CSI from other CR users and
PUs, the expected payoff utk and the interference function (from the CR user k to the PU l)
ηtk,l(b
t
l) for each CR user is unknown before the game.
For the PUs’ communications, after every primary data transmission, PU-Rxs will feed-
back an interference term that includes the background noise and the collection of the sum-
interference made from CR users. This information is used by PUs to monitor the inter-
ference level of the environment for the notification of the violation of interference power
constraint messages1 to CR networks and to conduct their own transmit power control. CR






Feedback Channel from 
PU-Rx to PU Tx
Interference Channel 
among CRs’ Tx and Rx
Forward Channel 
of  PUs 
CR-Tx is hearing PU-
Rx’s Feedback Channel
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from CR-Tx to PU-Rx
Forward Channel 
of  CR users 
Figure 4.1. CR users explore PUs-RX’s feedback information; they don’t have channel and power
strategy information from other CR users and to PUs.
users are assumed to have the capability to explore this feedback information from the con-
trol links of PUs as in [29] [56] [55]. The exploration process of this feedback information
can have errors and contain not updated values some time2. As for the wireless environ-
ments, the wireless channel can be modeled as a finite-state Markov channel (FSMC) [73],
where fading can be approximated as a discrete-time Markov process with time discretized
to a given time interval [74]. Thus, the behavior of each player (or user) in the wireless
fading environment can be modeled by a stochastic variable learning automation [75] that
consists a Markov chain of finite states.
Let (Ω,H, P) be a probability space, where Ω is the sample space; H is a minimal σ-
algebra on subsets ofΩ; and P is a probability measure on (Ω,H). The symbolω denotes an
event in the probability spaceΩ. The stochastic automaton operating in a dynamic wireless
from all CR users, and the PU-Rx calculate and feedback the channel outage ACK/NACK to the PU-Tx in
fading environments. Our assumption is of the same functionality as in [56] [55], but ours is much more
suitable for general wireless environments that includes fading and no-fading conditions (See Definition 1 in
Section I). The feedback background noise (sum-interference) information is a value of several bits that used
for the power control and interference management in the PU-Tx side.
2In the following analysis, this means the probability of error exploration of the interference level ap-
proaches to 0 almost surely, mathematically.
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environment is a adaptive discrete machine described by the tuple {Ξ,Pk, {Ptk}, {stk}, {utk}, {ηtk(btk)}, {ptk}},
where Ξ is the automation input bounded set; Pk, {Ptk}, {stk}, {utk}, {ηtk,l(btl)} are, the action set
of transmit power automaton (as we defined above), the sequences of automaton outputs
(actions) of transmit power, input channel states, input utilities/payoffs and input interfer-







T denote the mixed strategy
of transmit power of user k at time t, where Nk is the number of transmit power strategies
of user k. The mixed strategy ptk is the conditional probability distribution at time t



























btk = 0, 1, k = 1, ..,N, l = 1, .., M) is a σ-algebra that generated by all the histories event
over the action sets of CR users. Let Tt = Ttk represent a reinforcement learning (updating)
scheme of each CR user which changes the probability vector ptk to p
t+1







where Tt = Tt(ptk; {stk}t=1,...,t, {utk}t=1,...,t, {ηtk(btk)}t=1,...,t
, {Ptk}t=1,...,t), and γtk is a scaler correction factor. The vector Ttk(.) = [Ttk,1(.), ...,Ttk,Nk(.)]
T
satisfies the following conditions that guarantees the valid probability distribution:
∑Nk
i=1






k,i(.) ∈ [0, 1]. (4.2)
for any t and i = 1, ...,Nk. The above is the kernel of the the learning automation (LA).
4.1.2 Repeated Game Behavior
Non-cooperative power control is inherently a repeated process. Each user collects locally
the information from the network and then makes the decision of transmit power levels
locally. When new information (perhaps dependent on actions in the prior periods) is avail-
able, the decision process repeated itself. The learning-based repeated power-control game
is played in the following way. Consider a noncooperative game in which each player or
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of interference function (interference term) explored from PUs after the game. At each
stage (or time) t, each CR user will simultaneously and independently choose an action ac-
cording to the probability distribution (mixed strategy) ptk, for instance, the transmit power
Pk(ik), 1 ≤ ik ≤ Nk, 1 ≤ k ≤ N. Let the achievable data transmission rate rtk of CR user k
applied to the instant utility:
rtk(P


































N) ∈ P. The symbol W denotes the bandwidth of the primary
spectrum. K is the SINR gap between a practical data transmission rate and the Shannon
capacity limit. The function Gk j(stj) represents the channel gain from CR user k to CR user j
in channel state stj. The factors Gk j, 1 ≤ j ≤ N, incorporate propagation loss (slow-varying
and fast-varying parts), spreading gain, and other normalization constants. Notice that Gkk
is the path gain on link k. Assuming that not too many close-by nodes transmit at the same
time, with reasonable spreading gain, Gkk is much larger than other Gk j, (Gkk ≫ Gk j) j , k.
This assumption is the same as in [76], and we denote it as the interference non-dominance
condition. The notation ntk represents the instant noise of CR user k at time t, in which
σ2k is the noise power under the assumption of additive white Gaussian distribution, δk,l is
the interference from PU l’s transmission imposed on CR user k, and btl is the indicator
function of the existence of primary transmission.
Since each CR user only know its own transmit power strategy, the mixed instant utility








k(ik)) · ptk(ik). (4.4)
Similarly, the instant and the mixed instant interference function of CR user k imposed on
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btl ·ηtk,l(Ptk(ik)) · ptk(ik). (4.6)
Then, for each CR user, it changes its mixed strategy according to the accepted reinforce-
ment ptk


















Its time average should conform to the interference power constraint Cl. If the interference-
power-constraint-violation information is reported in its feedback control channel at time
t, this information (eavesdropped by CR users) will reinforce the CR users to change their







τ), liminft→∞Ψtl ≤ Cl. (4.9)
Note that in the above learning game, each individual CR user k only known its own
utility and the interference power level that is eavesdropped from PUs’ feedback control
link after the play in each step. It chooses the transmit power strategy Ptk(ik) with probability
ptk(ik) according to the reinforcement learning scheme described in the previous subsection.
As we know, in most researches in wireless communications, the wireless channels or
environments are assumed to be stationary. Hence this assumption on a sequence of real
functions (e.g., utility and interference function in this work) is just one special case that
needed in order for the results in the stochastic analysis to be true. In practice, the wireless
environment might experience with non-stationary observation of noise and interference.
Let us consider the non-stationary environment which is characterized by the following two
properties:
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Assumption 1: The conditional expectations of utk and η
t
l of the environment responses
exist, i.e.,
E{utk|Ptk=Pk(ik) ∧ Ht−1,∀k ∈ N} =r
i1,...,iN
k (t)






































The notation ri1,...,iNk (t) represents the expected transmission rate of the CR user k given
a specific transmit power strategy of i1, ..., iN for all the N CR users. Similarly, we have the
expected interference level ηi1,...,iNl (t) measured by the PU l. The first part of the assumption
A1 (4.10) states some kind of restriction to the properties of the observation noise. Take
the ηtl in (4.10) as an example, the condition will be satisfied if at every time t the noise
σl are bounded in second moments, i.e, E{σ2l } < ∞. This property holds, for example, for
Gaussian noises (it is assumed in (4.3)) and is not true for noise having Cauchy distribution.
The second property of assumption A1 (4.11) represents some kind of stationary in average.
It will be satisfied for the utility, interference function and noise, which are stationary in
average.
Assumption 2: For any realized action of the transmit power Ptk at current time t in the
repeated power-control game, the conditional variance of the utility utk and the interference
































η,l < ∞,∀k = 1, ...,N
(4.12)
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The notation σ+u,k and σ
+
η,l represent the upper bounds of the transmission rate of the CR
user k and interference function measured by the PU l. Since the number of transmit power
strategies for each CR user is finite and the channel gains of wireless environment (includ-




Definition 1: A random environment, satisfying conditions (4.10)∼(4.12) is said ”asymp-
totically stationary in the average sense”.
For each CR user, the average utility and interference function from the collection of 2
tensors Uk = [r
i1,...,iN
k (t)], (1 ≤ k ≤ N, 1 ≤ ik ≤ Nk) and Ql = [η
i1,...,iN
l (t)], (1 ≤ l ≤ M, 1 ≤
ik ≤ Nk) which are priori unknown. Thus, we can define the expected utility and expected
constraints concerning with all PUs’ and/or CR users’ CSI and transmit power strategy
information as follows.
Definition 2: At time t, for the CR user k in the considered game, and for any Ht−1-
measurable conditional probability distribution (pt1, ..., p
t























































j(i j), 1 ≤ j ≤ N is the expected transmit power of the mixed














































































Proof The proof is obtained in the view of Borel-Cantelli lemma [77] and the strong law of
large numbers for dependent sequence [78]. oω(t−1/2) is a random sequence tending almost
surely to zero, and more quickly than t−1/2.
4.2 Problem Formulation
4.2.1 Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium









ε=0= {ptk ∈ RNk : ptk(i)≥ε≥ 0,
Nk∑
i=1
ptk(i) = 1}. (4.14)
Definition 3: The power control strategies W∗1 , ...,W
∗
N in the noncooperative game are
defined as Nash Equilibrium if:
1) The power control strategies are admissible, where the interference function Ql is









N) ≤ Cl, (4.15)
where Cl are priori know values3;







U tk≥U(W∗1 , ...Wk...,W∗N), (4.16)
3Or can also be assumed unknown, in this case, when the CR users violate this constraint, PUs will send
the interference-constraints-violation message, and CR users can explore the interference level.
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where the maximization of (4.15) and the minimization of (4.16) are guaranteed over all
the initial probability distributions p1s , s ∈ N.
Definition 4: The point (p∗1, ..., p
∗
N) is said to be a Nash Equilibrium point of the given

















{pk : Ql(p∗1, ..., p∗k−1, pk, p∗k+1,..., p∗N)≤Cl}.
(4.17)
At the Nash Equilibrium point, no player can increase his payoff by a unilateral change
in its strategy.
Definition 5: A mixed strategy is said to be stationary, where Tk = {pk|
∑Nk
i=1 pk (i) =
1, 1 ≤ k ≤ N} is not changing with time after the learning of the repeated game process. The
set of distributions (p∗1, ..., p
∗
N) is called the stationary mixed strategy of Nash Equilibrium.
Remark 1: The set of all equilibrium strategies W∗k , where 1 ≤ k ≤ N, contains the
subsets of admissible stationary strategy {p∗k} for any 1 ≤ k ≤ N, 1 ≤ l ≤ M and for any
pk ∈ S Nkε=0 such that,
Uk(p∗1, ..., p
∗









This fact follows immediately from: 1) the continuity property of the utility function Uk
and the interference function Ql 4.13; 2) the compactness of the simplexes S
Nk
ε=0; 3) the
Nash theorem [79], Th. 1, p.268.
4.2.2 Game as Reinforcement Learning
Now we can formulate the repeated power-control game problem with a priori unknown
average utility and constraints. The objective of this power-control game is: based on the
current information (realized utility and interference), generate the mixed admissible strat-
egy {ptk},∀k ∈ N to achieve a realizable Nash Equilibrium within the subclass of stationary
strategies.
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To achieve this objective, we need to emphasize the following fact at first. Accord-
ing to the Nash theorem [79], the set of stationary distribution (p∗1, ..., p
∗
N) that satisfies
(4.18) might contain more than one element. For one of the Nash Equilibrium distribution
(p∗1, ..., p
∗
N), the objective is to show if an admissible mixed strategy Wk,∀k ∈ N converges
to such distribution (p∗1, ..., p
∗
N), then the associated random function of both utility and
interference Φtk (4.7)and Ψ
t
l (4.9) also converge to the corresponding expected stationary






N), respectively. This result is summarized in the fol-
lowing theorem.
Theorem 1: Under the assumption A1 and A2, there exists a strategy Wk,∀k ∈ N that is









||ptk − p∗k ||


















|Ψtl − Ql(p∗1, ..., p∗N)|
 a.s.= 0. (4.20)






















































































, and in the view of the
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are smooth enough, and it can be checked














∥∥∥ptk − p∗k∥∥∥ ,













) − Φtk/Ht−1|2 ≤ σ.















∥∥∥ptk − p∗k∥∥∥ + C2t2 .
By using the similar procedure, we can obtain the same inequality for the interference
power part, S tl,2.








Using lemma A. 13 [80] and considering the mathematical expectation of both sides of the
previous inequality, we obtain the desired results (4.20).
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Remark 2: This result shows that in the wireless environment, which is ”asymptotically
stationary in the average”, the convergence of stationary Nash equilibrium distribution of
(p∗1, ..., p
∗
N) always guarantee the convergence of transmission rates and interference func-
tions. The proof of this theorem relies on the application of Robbins-Siegmund theorem
(Robbins and Siegmund 1971) [81] in probability theory, a convergence theorem for de-
pendent random sequences.
Therefore, if we can construct an asymptotically (with time) stationary mixed strategy
{ptk} converging to a stationary distribution (p∗1, ..., p∗N) that realizes a Nash equilibrium, we
will achieve the main goal of this learning-based repeated power-control game. However, as
we known from the game theory, the set of stationary distributions (p∗1, ..., p
∗
N) that satisfying
(4.17) might not exist, or unique. To attain our main goal in a rigorous manner, at first, the
problem related to the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium should be solved.
In the next section, we deal with these problems.
4.3 Properties of Nash Equilibrium
4.3.1 Existence of Nash Equilibrium
To justify the correctness of Lagrange multipliers implementation and existence of nonemp-
ty set of admissible transmit power strategies, assume that the given interference constraints
satisfy the slater’s condition providing the Kuhn-Tucker constraint qualification [82].
Assumption A3: There exists a feasible strategy vectors ( p̃t1, ..., p̃
t
N) such that 1 ≤ k ≤ N
and 1 ≤ l ≤ M, the following inequalities hold:
Ql( p̃t1, ..., p̃
t
N) ≤ Cl. (4.24)
The next theorem shows the main result on the existence of Nash Equilibrium of the
power-control game.
Theorem 2: An Nash equilibrium point (that satisfies (4.17)) strategy exists for any
N-person game satisfying (A1) and (A3).
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is well defined for any p = (p1, ..., pN) and q = (q1, ..., qN) from R = (R
1 × ... × RN). It
is easy to prove ρ(p, q) is continuous in p and q. We can further prove ρ(p, q) is a strictly
concave function in q for any fixed p.








P j · p jGk j(s j)+nk+KPk · qkGkk(sk)
> 0. (4.26)








P j ·p jGk j(s j)+nk+KPk ·qkGkk(sk)
)2 <0. (4.27)
We obtain the Hessian:
Hk = diag(∇2q1ρ(p, q), ...,∇
2
qNρ(p, q)). (4.28)
Matrix Hk is obviously negative definite: for all vectors v,





Therefore, ρ(p, q) is a strictly concave function in q for any fixed p within R. Notice that
R is convex, compact and nonempty by (A3) and (4.24). Then, the point-to-set mapping
p ∈ R→ Γp ⊂ R given by
Γp =
{





is upper semi-continuous in R, and, hence, by Kakutani fixed point theorem (see, e.g. [84]
), there exists a point p∗ ∈ R such that p∗ ∈ Γp∗, that is




This fixed point p∗ ∈ R satisfies (4.17). Indeed, suppose that (4.17) is not verified, e.g.,
for k = k0, there exists a point pk0 such that p
∗(k0) = (p∗1, ..., pk0 , ..., p
∗
N) ∈ R. We have








N) that implies ρ(p
∗, p∗(k0)) > ρ(p∗, p∗) which
contradicts (4.31).
4.3.2 Uniqueness of Nash Equilibria
The condition for uniqueness of equilibria are known as strict diagonal concavity. Accord-
ing to Rosen’s theorem 2 in [83], we show that if the given matrix game is ”strictly diagonal
concave”, then the corresponding game turns out to be strictly diagonal concave, and the
uniqueness of the equilibria policy follows.
4.3.2.1 Diagonal Concavity Properties
Let us define the function
Wr(p, q) = (q − p)
∂
∂p




where ρr(p, q) =
N∑
k=1
rkUk(p1, ..., qk...., pN).
Definition 6: A matrix game is said to be diagonal concave if there exists positive
numbers rk such that for any p, q ∈ R
Wr(p, q) ≥ 0; (4.33)
a matrix game is said to be strict diagonal concave if there is a positive numbers rk such
that for any p, q ∈ R, the strict inequality holds above. The basic properties of the diagonal
concave games can be found in [85].
4.3.2.2 Uniqueness of the Power-Control Game
As already mentioned above, the equilibrium probability distribution may not be unique.
We will prove that the proposed matrix game for CR power control is strict diagonal con-
cave, and admit a unique Nash equilibrium
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Lemma 2: The matrix game for CR user power control in the interference non-dominance
condition is a strict diagonal concave game, i.e.,
Wr(p, q) > 0. (4.34)
Proof Let us first expand the function Wr(p, q),





j,k P j·q jGk j(s j)+nk+KPk·pkGkk(sk)
+
Wr·(p−q)(KPkGkk(sk))∑ j∈N
j,k P j·p jGk j(s j)+nk+KPk·qkGkk(sk)
=
Wr·(p−q)2(KPkGkk(sk))(∑ j∈N






j,k P jGk j(s j)
)(∑ j∈N
j,k P j·p jGk j(s j)+nk+KPk ·qkGkk(sk)
) ,
(4.35)
where r = (r1, ..., rk, ..., rN). Since we have Gkk(sk) ≫ Gk j(s j) in the interference non-
dominance condition, and K approaches to 1 in a median SINR value of transmissions,
it can guarantee that KPkGkk(sk)−
∑ j∈N
j,k P jGk j(s j) in (4.35) are always positive for the CR
users in the most typical weak interference high data rate (SINR) scenarios. So, that proves
there must exist a rk such that Wr(p, q) > 0.
Theorem 3: The matrix game for CR user power control admits a unique Nash Equi-
librium.
Proof The proof is straight forward, because of the power-control game is strict diagonal
concave according to lemma 2. It is a direct outcome of Rosen’s theorem [83].
Therefore, we can claim that the power-control game converges to a unique equilibrium
point, during the learning process.
4.3.3 Lagrange Multipliers Using Regularization Approach
To get the Nash equilibrium of the CR users’ power control strategy in (4.17), Lagrange
multiplier method can be used. The corresponding Lagrange function is given by









where λl > 0 and the arguments pk belong to the ε−simplexes (4.14). Since the interference
power constraint (4.15) is not strictly convex (multilinearity of interference function) and,
as a consequence, any attempt to directly apply the gradient technique for finding its saddle
point may fail because of divergence.
One approach for avoiding this problem consists of introducing a regularization term in
the corresponding Lagrange function [86]










)T . These regularized functions are strictly concave with respect
to pk, and strictly convex with respect to rk. The next theorem describes the dependence




t, δt)) of the regularized function with
the regularizing δt, εtk for convergence.
Theorem 4: If the sequence {εtk} and {δt} are such that
εtk ∈ (0, 1/Nk) , δt > 0, limt→∞ δ











t, δt)) of the equilibrium-points of the corresponding Lagrange




k ) of the initial












t))→ (p∗k, λ∗k), t → ∞. (4.37)
where
p∗∗k = arg minp∗,λ∗
1
2
(∥p∗∥2 + ∥λ∗∥2). (4.38)
Proof The proof is similar to [87], we omit it due to space limitation.
The following two lemmas are two useful conclusions related to Theorem 4, which will be
used in the convergence analysis of the learning algorithm in Section VI.
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(∥∥∥ptk − p∗(εtk, δt)∥∥∥2 + ∥∥∥λtk − λ∗(εtk, δt)∥∥∥2)
≤ ∑Nk=1 rk[(ptk − p∗(εtk, δt))T ∂∂ptk Lδk(p1, ..., pN; λn)
−(λtk − λ∗(εtk, δt))T ∂∂λn L
δ
k(p1, ..., pN; λn)] ≤ 0.
where (p∗k, λ
∗
k) is the equilibrium-point of the regularized Lagrange function.
Proof The right-hand-side inequality is always hold due to the Kuhn-Tucker saddle point
theorem [86]; the right-hand-side inequality is obtained according to the property of Kuhn-
Tucker saddle point theorem and the Jensen’s inequality [86]. The detailed proof is omitted
due to space limitation.
Lemma 4: Under the same conditions as in Theorem 4, 1) all the possible equilibrium























(∥∥∥pk(υ)−p∗(εtk, δt)∥∥∥2+∥∥∥λk(υ)−λ∗(εtk, δt)∥∥∥2) →n→∞ 0.








∥∥∥δt+1 − δt∥∥∥ + c3 ∥∥∥εt+1/δt+1 − εt/δt∥∥∥= βt.
(4.39)
Proof A similar proof can be found in [87]. The detailed proof is omitted due to space
limitation.
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4.4 Reinforcement Learning Algorithm
4.4.1 The Complete Information Case
At first, let us review the power control problem in the complete information case, when
the expected utility and interference functions4 are available. In this case, the Lagrange
multiplier and the projection of gradient procedure can be applied for the class of diagonal






































{·} is the projection operation to the simplex S Nk
εt=0, λ
t
l is the dual price for η
t
l,
and [·]+ is the ”take positive part” operator. If the parameters of this procedure satisfy
γtk, δt, ε
t → 0 and ∑∞t=1 γtkδt = ∞,∑∞t=1 βt <∞. (βt is defined by (4.39)), it provides the






in the Lemma 4.
4.4.2 The Incomplete Information Case
In the case of incomplete information case that concerned in this work, that is, only the
current realizations of utility utk and the function of interference level η
t
l explored from PUs
are available; the direct application of the Lagrange multiplier approach is infeasible. The














. This new procedure requires the estimation of the mixed power
control strategies by using the implementation of the current realizations. This procedure
is known as reinforcement leaning algorithm, which can be implemented in different ways.
In order to present concrete learning procedures, Let us first briefly introduce the basic
concept of reinforcement schemes in learning automation [80].
4more specifically, the interference function of every CR user k imposed on PU l, ηtk,l are known for each
CR user in the networks. Thus, the sum-interference ηtl is known in advance.
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4.4.3 Reinforcement Schemes in Learning Automation
It has been shown in Section II lemma 1 that the stochastic constrained power-control game
in (4.7),(4.9) is asymptotically equivalent to the problem related to the determination of the
equilibrium-point of the regularized function Lδk(p1, ..., pN; λ), using the realizations of the
cost function and the constraints. This equivalent problem can be formulated and solved as
the behavior of a variable-stochastic automation in multi-teacher environment [88]. Fig. 2
refers to the schematic block diagram for the learning automation to operating in a multi-
teacher environment. We note that the normalized procedure processes as a mapping from
the teachers’ responses (ζ tk, 1 ≤ k ≤ N) to the learning automation input of CR users’
utility (ut) and (ηt),1 ≤ k ≤ N, 1 ≤ l ≤ M. The role of the environment is to establish the
relation between the actions of the automation and the signals received at its input, which
is described as the learning automation in Section I.
Reinforcement schemes are found successful application in the field of learning au-
tomata [62]. A reinforcement scheme is similar to the recursive estimation procedure used
in adaptive control. The reinforcement scheme generates pt+1 from pt based on incremen-
tal changes in the probabilities. Several algorithms for adjusting the probabilities after
each sampling period (interaction with the environment) have been proposed [87]. The
most commonly used one is a linear updating algorithm have been proposed by Bush and
Mosteller [62]. All the reinforcement schemes described in the literature can be considered
as being solutions of optimization problems. The following describe the average penalty
function for a single user i in the repeated power-control game.
J = {Φi(pt)Ei[1 − ξi] − Ψi(pt)Ei[ξi]}. (4.41)
where the functions Φi(pt) and Ψi(pt) represent the amount of change in the probability
vector under the expected reward (ξi = 0) and expected penalty (ξi = 1). In the case when
the complete information on the expected utilities and constraints (i.e., the channel and
mixed power strategy information for CR users and/or PUs) is available, then the gradient-





















Figure 4.2. Learning automaton of multi-teacher environment
attain the equilibrium point. This corresponds to and similar to the traditional power control
schemes in CR networks as [26] [24].
To minimize the penalty function J, the reinforcement scheme that sets the gradient of





















We have just derived is one of the central result of reinforcement schemes. In general, all
the existing learning schemes fall into the general framework (4.42) in the learning-based
game-theoretical problem setting up.
In this work, the widely used Bush-Mosteller reinforcement scheme [62] is adopted,










4.4.4 Bush-Mosteller-Reinforcement-based Lagrange Multipliers
For the unknown expected utility and constraints of each CR user, the Bush-Mosteller
reinforcement scheme and the normalization procedure presented in [87] will be applied
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hereafter to design a new learning algorithm for the N-user constrained repeated power-
control game. In fact, we assume that after each stage, the utility as well as the constraints
to each CR user are random variables. No information concerning the distribution of the
utility and constraints is available. The necessary information is obtained during the course
of the game. The learning control is an iterative process involving an adaption at each stage
(or time).
Since our formulated power control problem in (4.7) and (4.9) is a stochastic optimiza-





k) to be optimized. It is evident that we can not directly use these schemes
for the optimization purposes. In fact, environment responses (in the probability sense)
have to belong to the unit interval [0, 1]. But the available observations do not obligatory
satisfies this conditions.
In order to solve this problem, a procedure called ”normalization procedure” (as de-
scribed in Fig.2), which establish the connection between the environment response ζ tk and
the available observations (ut) and (ηt) has been initially described in [80] in order to keep
the automation input within the unit segment. For the normalized procedure of the Bush-
Mosteller scheme [62], we have the following lemma from [87], Lemma 2, p.268:
Lemma 5: If, some positive monotonically decreasing {τtk} (0 < τtk ↓ 0) ∀k ∈ N, and

























then, the automaton input belongs to (0, 1].
Now, the ”four-step” recursive algorithm for the learning-based power-control game is
presented.
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Algorithm: Reinforcement-Learning-based CR Power Control
















and normalize (scale) them according to the following procedure:
ζ tk= 1 − (atkũtk + btk)/ptk(ik) (4.46)















k + (Nk − 1)(τtk)2(1 + (Nk − 2)τtk)−1
ãtk = τ
t





Step 2: Set the initial values of probability distribution among all the transmit power




k (i) = 1. Update the probability distribution p
t+1
k and the















k) = (0, ..., 0, 1︸    ︷︷    ︸
ik
, 0, ..., 0)T ∈ RNk (4.49)
If Ptk = Pk(ik) and e
Nk = (1, ..., 1)T ∈ RNk . Here, the time-varying correction (adaptation)
factors γtk belong to the unit segment. Notice that the conditional mathematical expectation
of the normalized environment responses ũtkeNk(P
t
k) is equal to the gradient of the augment-




Lδk(p1, ..., pN; λn). (4.50)
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The Lagrange multipliers are adjusted according to the following lowing recursion;









tλtl − ηtl +Cl.
(4.51)
Also, note that the conditional mathematical expectation of ψtl is equal to the gradient












x, i f x ∈ [0, λ+t+1]
λ+t+1, i f x > λ
+
t+1
0, i f x < 0.
Step 3: According to
Pr{Pt+1k = Pk(i)|Ht} = pt+1k (i) (4.53)
generate randomly new discrete random variables pt+1k for each CR user as in the learning
stochastic automata implementation, and get a new observations (realizations) ut+1k and η
t+1
l
that correspond to the environment vector-reactions.
Step 4: Return to Step 1.
The positive sequence {εtk}, {δt}, {λ+t }, {γtk}, and {γtλ} will be defined next.
This adaptive Learning algorithm is constructed using the Bush-Mosteller reinforce-
ment scheme (4.48) with the time-varying correction factors γtk, continuous input ũ
t
k, and
a normalization procedure which is used to ensure the probability measure. It is easy to
verify that ζ tk ∈ (0, 1) for any time t, and ptk ∈ S
Nk
εn .
4.5 Convergence Analysis and Learning Rate
4.5.1 Convergence Analysis
The following theorem acclaims the convergence of the learning-based repeated power-
control game.
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Theorem 5 Suppose that the Assumption A1-A3 hold for the learning reinforcement
procedure (4.48)- (4.51) and the CR power control is diagonal concave. In addition, assume
that:
• There exists four nonnegative sequences {εtk}, {δt}, {γtk}, and {γtλ} such that {γtk} ↓ 0,
δt ∈ (0, δ+), δt ↓ 0 and εtk ∈ (0, (1/Nk)), εtk ↓ 0, limsupn(εtk/δt) < ∞;
• The updating factor γtk, and γ
t






, 1 ≤ k ≤ N. (4.54)

















 < ∞. (4.55)




































Then, the mixed strategy of CR users ensure the convergence of the game to the equi-
librium point, i.e., ∑N
k=1 rk(
∥∥∥p∗k(εt+1k , δt+1) − p∗k(εtk, δt)∥∥∥2
+
∥∥∥λ∗k(εt+1, δt+1) − λ∗k(εt, δt)∥∥∥2) →t→∞ 0. (4.56)
Proof The techniques used in the proof are based on the Lyapunov approach and Martin-
gale’s theory. A proof for similar problem can be referred in [87], page 123. We omit the
proof here for brevity and not aside from the main subject of our discussion.




−γ, εtk = ε
0
kt
−ε, γ0k , ε
0
k , δ
0, λ+0 > 0






The conditions of Theorem 5 will be verified is
γ + ε + δ + λ ≤ 1(γ > 0, ε ≥ δ > 0, λ ≥ 0) (4.58)
and the convergence is ensured if
2γ > 1. (4.59)
Proof The proof of the convergence follows directly by substituting (4.57)-(4.59) into the





= ∞, i fα ≤ 1
< ∞, i fα > 1.
4.5.2 Learning Rate
As we know, not only the convergence of the power-control game is important but the speed
is also essential. For the specific class of the design parameters (4.56), the next theorem
states the convergence rate of the learning game algorithm described above.
Theorem 6: Under the condition of the previous theorems and for the class of design





(∥∥∥ptk − p∗(υ)∥∥∥2 + ∥∥∥λtk − λ∗(υ)∥∥∥2) = o(n−v),
where the order v of the adaptation rate satisfies the following constraint:
v < v∗(γ, δ, ε, λ) ≤ v∗∗ = 13
v∗(γ, δ, ε, λ)= min{2γ − 1; γ + δ; ε − δ + γ; 2δ}








Proof The expression of v∗(γ, δ, ε, λ) follows from [87] Lemma A.3-2, App. A. The opti-















Figure 4.3. User location in the network.
v∗(γ, δ, ε, λ) → max over tall the parameters ε ≥ δ satisfying (4.57) and (4.58). The solu-




min{2γ − 1; γ + δ; ε − δ + γ; 2δ}
≤ (by γ ≤ 1 − δ − ε − λ)
max
1−δ−ε−λ
min{1 − 2ε − 2λ; 1 − ε − λ; 1 − 2δ − λ; 2δ}
= max
1−δ−ε−λ
min{1 − 2ε − 2λ; 2δ}
= (byε = 1/2 − 2δ − λ)
= max
δ≤ε
2δ = 1/3, under δ = 1/6 and λ = 0.
4.6 Simulation Results
In this section, simulation results are presented for the repeated power-control game in CR
networks. We consider there are multiple CR Tx-Rx pairs and one PU Tx-Rx pair sharing
a spectrum band with the bandwidth of 1MHZ. We set up a system of CR users and the
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Time steps of the learning process
 
 
CR user 1, power strategy 0.02 W
CR user 1,  power strategy 0.2 W
CR user 1,  power strategy 1 W
Figure 4.4. Learning process of the mixed strategy: CR user 1.
PU with their locations shown in Fig.3. The simulation parameters are set as: the distance
of the CR Tx-Rx is 250m; The action sets of transmit power is Pk = {0.02, 0.2, 1}Watt,
the noise of the measurement is according to a zero-mean Gaussian noise, where its power
is σ2k = −118.45dBm. The channel gain is settled to be a log-normal shadowing path
loss model, gk = (1/dk)4. For the fading part, we use the finite-state Markov channel
(FSMC) to model the Rayleigh fading channel, where the number of sates and parameters
of the channel model is given in [89]. This network set-up guarantees the interference
non-dominance condition, where the interference from other CR users and the background
noise is less than the transmit power of each CR user. We consider the PU to be always
active, where bl = 1. The interference power constraint can change and be set to different
values. The default interference power constraint in the PU-Rx is set to be −115.37dBm,
which is a light interference constraint. As a typical illustration, a random initial probability
distribution of the mixed strategies are generated for the CR user 1, the CR user 2 and the
CR user 3: p11 = {0.59, 0.28, 0.13} , p12 = {0.74, 0.21, 0.05}, and p12 = {0.84, 0.07, 0.09},
respectively. For the utility function in (3), we set K = 1, where the transmission rate is the
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Time steps of the learning process
 
 
CR user 2, power strategy 0.02 W
CR user 2,  power strategy 0.2 W
CR user 2,  power strategy 1 W
Figure 4.5. Learning process of the mixed strategy: CR user 2.
information-theoretical capacity. The time duration of the learning process for the game is
considered in the CRN with the period of t = 1000 steps. The parameters of the learning
procedure were as follows:
ε = ε∗=δ=δ∗=16, γ=γ∗=2/3, ε0 = 0.25
λ = λ∗ = 0, λ+0 = δ
0 = 0.1, γ0 = 0.15,
The proposed learning-based power-control algorithm is implemented based on all initial
values give above. And, all the sequences will be decreased according to the learning
algorithm until convergence.
Fig. 4, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show the convergence process of the probability distribution
of the mixed strategy of each CR users. The first observation from our simulation results
is that, when every time we generate a random initial probability distributions of the mixed
strategies, the equilibrium state of the transmit power level calculated by the mixed strategy
of each user is independent with these initial values. This result confirms the theory of
convergence in Section VII. Secondly, when comparing the equilibrium state of the mixed
strategy of CR users 1, 2, and 3, we can observe that the nearer the CR Tx-Rx to the other
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Time steps of the learning process
 
 
CR user 3, power strategy 0.02 W
CR user 3,  power strategy 0.2 W
CR user 3,  power strategy 1 W
Figure 4.6. Learning process of the mixed strategy: CR user 3.
CR Tx-Rxs, the less the transmit power level (a dot product of mixed strategy probability
and the transmit power set) in the equilibrium state. However, we donot observe much
more interference penalty on CR users’ transmit power, when CR users are nearer to the
PU-Rx. An illustration on this point is the CR user 3. Even though the CR user 3 is much
more hear to the PU-Rx than the CR user 2 and CR user 1, thus the interference is larger,
the transmit power of the CR user 3 is just a little bit higher than the CR user 2. The inside
rationale is as follows: as we know, each CR user has blind CSI information from its Tx
to the PU-Rx, and CR users can only explore the sum-interference measured by PU-Rx
from its feedback control link, the interference penalty price λtk for each CR user in equ.
(4.51) is the same for each CR user. Correspondingly, the expected-version of subgradient
updating process of the interference penalty in (4.52) that is plugged into equ.(4.40) is the
same for each user. However, on the other hand, in equ. (4.45), we can observe the utility
function of each CR user is different due to the inter-CR-user interference level, the CR
user 1 suffers the least interference, the CR user 3 suffers less, and the CR user 2 suffers the
most heavy interference. This affect the expected value of subgradient of transmit power
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Time steps of the learning process
 
 
CR user 1 learning
CR user 1 Comp. Info.
CR user 2 learning
CR user 2 Comp. Info.
CR user 3 learning
CR user 3 Comp. Info.
Figure 4.7. Learning process of the transmission rates.
in equ. (4.50), and finally affect the transmit power updating process in equ.(4.40). The
result can be clearly viewed from the equ.(4.40): the higher the expected subgradient the
higher the equilibrium transmit power. This result is similar to the result in the classic
game-theoretical approach without the “pricing” scheme5. The simulation results shown in
Fig. 4, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 conform the theoretical analysis.
Fig. 7 shows the learning process of averaged transmission rate for the CR users under
the light interference constraints condition of the PU. The results are compared with the
theoretical results of the power-control game with complete information case: each CR
user knows all the CSI and transmit power strategy in the network, and then the sum-
interference of all CR users ηtl can be calculated by each CR user in the power control
process in equ.(4.40). This scenario is equivalent to the classic power-control game case in
CR networks without the pricing schemes from PUs as shown in [26], [24], [27]. It can be
observed that the averaged transmission rate of each CR user in the learning process will
converge and approach to the equilibrium point in the complete information game case,
and this simulation results confirm the conclusion of the Lemma 1. As we can see, at this
5There is no incentive of the interference power penalty for each individual CR user from PUs based on
the interference level of each individual CR user.
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Figure 4.8. Learning process of the interference level: light.
time, the time interval (or iterations) required to achieve the equilibriums is longer than
the classic one. This is the expense of no prior knowledge of CSI and transmit power
strategy of other users in the network. However, in this scenario, CR users only need to
explore several bits information of the interference-level from the feedback link of the PU
and use the transmission rate they tried in each step, where the algorithm implementation
complexity is very low. It is suitable and adaptable for highly dynamic changing radio-
access environments.
Fig.8 shows the convergence process of the interference power of each CR user in the
light interference constraint condition. In this case, the CR users transmit with higher
power in the equilibrium condition than the CR users in the heavy interference constraint
condition (−117.47dBm) in Fig. 9. An interesting observation is, when the interference
constraint is low (as shown in Fig. 9), the convergence process of interference power of
CR users change much more rapidly in the initial steps than the case when the interference
constraint is high ( as shown in Fig.8). Especially, this phenomenon is clearly seen for the
dominant interference CR users, e.g., the CR user 3 in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9. Moreover, it
can be found that, at the initial stages of the repeated power-control game, the interference
power constraint of the PU is violated, and it is gradually being met during the learning
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Figure 4.9. Learning process of the interference level: heavy.
process. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions in (29) (32) (33): the learning
algorithm will enforce the transmit power strategy largely to reduce the interference caused
by each CR user until it conforms to the interference power constraint.
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CHAPTER 5
CAPACITY AND DELAY SCALING IN COGNITIVE RADIO AD
HOC NETWORKS: IMPACT OF PRIMARY USER ACTIVITY
5.1 Network Model and Definitions
In this section, we describe the network model and define the throughput capacity and delay
in CRAHNs.
A. Network Architecture
The network consists of two components: CRAHN and primary network. CRAHN is
an ad hoc network containing only secondary nodes. As in [8] [12][13][14], we assume
a random network model with static secondary nodes for CRAHNs. Consider a square of
unit area A = [0, 1]×[0, 1], in which secondary nodes are randomly distributed according to
a Poisson point process (P.P.P.) of density n. Let the transmission range of each secondary
node denote by r(n). As indicated in [90], the transmission range r(n) needs to satisfy
r(n) ≥ Θ(
√
log n/n) to make the network connected. The source-destination (S-D) pairs
are randomly chosen in the network region.
In addition to the CRAHN, there are m pairs of independent primary nodes distribut-
ed in the unit area square. Each pair of primary nodes contains a primary transmitter
and its intended receiver. For spectrum overlay scenario, the transmission range r(m) of
these primary nodes should have no intersection, otherwise interference will occur. To
ease the analysis of the problem, we assume each primary receiver’s interference range
is within the primary nodes’ transmission range to avoid interfering secondary transmit-
ters that lie outside but near the primary nodes’ transmission range 1. This assumption
accords to the typical channel access model for two heterogenous networks: the symmetric
channel access model as in [91] [92], where a channel can be used when neither primary
1For general cases as in [91], the interference range doesn’t need to be totally covered in the transmission
range, but this shape difference doesn’t affect the scalability of CRAHNs while our analysis is largely simpled.
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nodes’ interference range are within secondary nodes’ transmission range nor secondary
nodes’ interference range are within primary nodes’ transmission range. It guarantees the
interference-free transmission of both forward and backward links of primary networks and
CRAHN. This scenario corresponds to (but not limited to) a broadcast network, such as the
TV or the cellular networks, in which the primary transmitters are fixed base-stations.
For spectrum overlay, when any primary transmitter is active, all the traffic of secondary
nodes in its transmission range cannot be transmitted, or transmission collision occurs. To
derive the achievable throughput capacity for CRAHN, we assume secondary nodes can
always utilize the off time of primary transmissions, and there are no sensing errors and the
switching delay between the on and off states. In this fundamental work, PU activity can be
modeled as exponentially distributed inter-arrivals [93] two-state birth-death process, and
it is i.i.d for each pair of primary nodes. The birth rate (active periods) has a geometric
distribution with parameter pB and the death rate (inactive periods) has a geometric distri-
bution with parameter pI . The average busy and idle times are thus given by α = 1/pB and
β = 1/pI . An ON (active) state represents the period used by PUs, and an OFF (inactive)
state represents the unused period. Since each user arrival is independent, each transmis-
sion follows the Poisson arrival process. So, we can estimate the probabilities of ON and








B. Interference Model of CRAHN
The interference model used in this work are the protocol model for dense networks
introduced in [8], which is suitable for overlay CRAHNs: a transmission from node Xi is
successfully received by node X j if the following two conditions are satisfied: 1) |Xi − X j|≤
r(n) and 2) |Xk −X j|≥ (1+∆)r(n). Xi, X j and Xk are the locations of secondary nodes. ∆ > 0
guarantees a guard zone to prevent a neighboring secondary node from transmitting on the
same channel simultaneously.
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C. Routing Strategies of the CRAHN
The data transmission mechanism for the CRHAN is a time-division multiplexing (TD-
MA) scheme for the data transmission as in [8]. Time is divided into slots of fixed durations.
In each time slot, a secondary node is scheduled to send packets. The TDMA scheme is
designed with consideration of the interference model to avoid interference as in [8]. We
consider two typical routing schemes for CRAHN, one is the routing scheme as defined
in [8] that is proved to achieve the best delay performance; the other is a typical routing
scheme (and scheduling policy) with queuing and buffering proposed by ourselves, and it
is proved of general value and achieving the best throughput capacity. Routing Scheme 1:
every secondary node in CRAHN will transmit or relay its packets in the time slot allocat-
ed to it. The queue length of each nodes are known [12] to be Θ(1), which is independent
with n, and secondary nodes will transmit with full throughput capacity Θ(W/
√
n log n).
However, collision will occur when secondary node transmissions meet the active primary
transmissions, and thus the corresponding secondary data will be lost; Routing Scheme 2:
when the time slot is allocated to a secondary node, the secondary node determines whether
to transmit its traffic or not based on the sensing information of PU activity. When the PU
is active, the secondary node will store its traffic in its queue; otherwise it will transmit. As
shown in the next analysis, the maximum per-node throughput capacity can be achieved.
However, the end-to-end delay is largely increased, and the queue length of each node is
dependent to both primary nodes and secondary nodes density.
D. Definitions of Throughput Capacity of CRAHN
We extend the definition of [8] for the per-node throughput to CRAHN, denoted by
λ (n,m). Due to the impact of PU activity, the per-node throughput capacity should be
observed as the time-average of a long time duration: let λi (n,m) be the total number of
bits delivered end-to-end for source-destination pair i up to time t, then the throughput
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λ (n,m) of the CRAHN is given by









A per-node throughput of λ is said to be feasible if there exists n0 such that for any n > n0,
there exists a placement rule of PUs, a specific transmission range, PU activity distribution,
and a spatial and temporal scheduling scheme for transmission by allowing buffering at
intermediate nodes (if necessary) in CRAHN with the property that each bit transmitted by










 = 1. (5.2)
E. Definition of Average Packet Delay of CRAHN
The end-to-end delay of a packet is the time it takes to reach the destination after leaving
the source. Usually, network delay contains the followings parts [94]: propagation delay,
processing delay, queuing delay and transmission delay. In [10] [34], multi-hopping delay
as the major contributor in end-to-end delay is calculated, and the queuing delay of source
node is of constant order Θ(1), which scales shower than it, is ignored. The multi-hopping
delay counts the number of hops passed by the S-D routing path, which can be referred as
processing and propagation delays.
Unlike classic ad hoc networks, CRAHN may not always transmit due to PU activity:
using the Routing Scheme 2, the secondary nodes need to buffer their traffic in their queues
when primary nodes are active, so there is no secondary traffic in transmission. As a result,
queuing and transmission delays occur. Consequently, the end-to-end delay by using Rout-
ing Scheme 2 contains three parts: multi-hopping delay, queuing and transmission delays.
The average packet delay of a network is obtained by averaging over all transmitted packets
in the network.
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5.2 Capacity and Delay of CRAHN under Regular Dense Primary
Network
First we analyze the capacity and delay of CRAHN under a typical primary network topolo-
gy, namely, regular dense primary network. The definition is as follows: (1) the m primary
transmitters are regularly placed in the unit area square with equal transmission range r(m);
(2) all the primary receivers are within its own primary transmitter’s transmission range;
(3) the density of primary nodes are as dense as possible, such that all of their transmis-
sion range are nearly contingent with each other in a ”compact” form as illustrated in Fig.
1. We call this primary network as regular dense primary network, where nearly all the
secondary nodes are covered within primary nodes’ transmission ranges. Obviously, this
primary network scenario achieves the worst capacity and delay performance in CRAHNs.
In Fig.1, we first divide the unit area square into m cells of size a(m) = 1/m where each
primary transmitter is located at the center of each cell. Then we divide the unit area square
into micro cells of size a (n) = c log n/n, where c ≥ 1. The following lemma guarantees that
each micro cell is occupied by at least one secondary node with high probability (w.h.p.).
It can be proved by using the property of P.P.P. and the well-known results (for example,
see [95], chapter 3). Due to space limitation, we do not repeat the proof here.
Lemma 1: Divide the network into micro cells of size
√
c log n/n ×
√
c log n/n, with
c ≥ 1, every micro cell is occupied by at least one secondary node w.h.p.
For secondary nodes communication, we can set r(n)=
√
5a(n) such that any secondary
node in one micro cell can transmit to the secondary nodes in its four neighboring micro
cells. For each source-destination (S-D) pair, we draw a straight line that connects the
S-D pair (S-D line), and it intersects some micro cells on its path. The source secondary
node chooses some of these micro cells intersect with the S-D line to relay the traffic to its
destination. The corresponding routing path of the S-D pair is illustrated in Fig. 1.
For regular dense primary network, we consider the case where all the secondary nodes
are within the primary nodes’ transmission ranges w.h.p. It means that the transmission
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a(m)/2 to guarantee all the secondary nodes
are within these transmission ranges w.h.p. Because the density of primary network is high,
the blue region in Fig. 1 should not be occupied by secondary nodes w.h.p. By simple
calculations, the area of the blue region is 4−π4
1











, the probability that the blue region is occupied by at most one secondary
node is less than 1 w.h.p. Let us denote this probability by p. So the probability that the
source node can find relay nodes that are not covered by primary nodes’ transmission region
scales to pΘ(
√
m). When m→∞, it will approach 0. That means when m = ω (n/log n), every
secondary S-D pair cannot find a routing path outside the primary nodes’ transmission
ranges w.h.p. This is the worst case that all the secondary traffic must be affected by the
PU activity.
The following lemma is a straightforward conclusion from [8] and [10] that guarantees
the interference among secondary nodes is independent of n.
Lemma 2: The number of micro cells that interfere with any given micro cell is upper
bounded by a constant c3, and is independent of n.
A consequence of Lemma 2 is that there exists an interference-free schedule where each
micro cell becomes active regularly and no micro cell interferes with any other simultane-
ously transmitting micro cell in CRAHNs.
The following two lemmas follow the proof outline in [10]. We omit them due to space
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limitation.




Lemma 4:When the primary network is always inactive over time, by using the Routing
Scheme 1 with a(n) ≥ c log nn , the throughput and multi-hopping delay of CRAHN become
T (n) = Θ(W/n
√
a (n)) and DH(n) = Θ(1/
√
a (n)), i.e., the achievable throughput-delay
trade-off is T(n)=Θ( D(n)n ).
In the next two subsections, we analyze the capacity and delay scaling for CRAHNs by
using Routing Schemes 1 and 2.
5.2.1 CRAHN with Routing Scheme 1











sponding end-to-end delay is D(n,m) = Θ(
√
n/log n).
Proof Since the transmission range of each primary node is Θ(
√







number of primary cells passed by a packet from a secondary node through the S-D line
i is Θ(li/
√
a(m)), where li is the length of S-D line i. Thus, the number of primary cells





a (m)). Since m and n are independent variables, for large n, the average







= Θ (1). So the average number of primary cells passed
by a packet from a secondary node averaged over all S-D pairs is Θ(1/
√
a (m)) = Θ(
√
m).





n log n). Using Routing Scheme 1, the secondary nodes
need to transmit their packets when its time slot is available. The condition for successful
packets transmission is the case that all the primary cells along its routing path is inactive,
or collision occurs and secondary data are lost. Since the average number of primary cells
passed by a packet averaged over all S-D pairs is Θ(
√
m) and each primary cell’s activity
is independent of others, the average probability of successful packets transmission from
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source to destination for each S-D pair is PΘ(
√
m)





















In this case, there is only multi-hopping delay as in classical ad hoc wireless networks.





From equ.(3), we can see, compared to the classic ad hoc networks, the per-node
throughput capacity of CRAHN will drain rapidly at an exponential rate with m when Poff
is fixed or at a polynomial rate with Poff when m is fixed in the condition of no additional
queueing and buffering strategy in the regular dense primary scenario. This results reveal
the strong dependence of primary network topology and CRAHN performance. It suggests
the necessity of novel protocol design for CRAHNs to improve the throughput capacity.
5.2.2 CRAHN with Routing Scheme 2
We consider the throughput capacity and delay scaling for CRAHN by using the Routing
Scheme 2, where secondary nodes buffer their traffic in queues when the corresponding
primary cell is active; otherwise, they can transmit. We first investigate the throughput
capacity and delay trade-off, and the required average queue length in each secondary node.
Then, as a direct result, the maximal achievable per-node throughput capacity, end-to-end
delay, and queue length are present.
Theorem 2: Under regular dense primary network where m = ω(n/ log n), by using
Routing Scheme 2, the per-node throughput capacity of CRAHN and the queueing and








), for DQT(n,m) = O (K) ,
where 1 ≤ K ≤ Θ(
√






Proof In Fig.1, we denote the length of the S-D line is li. So the number of primary cells
that the S-D line passes is N = Θ(li/
√
a(m)). Fig. 2 illustrates the process of how to
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calculate the throughput of the S-D pair. In Fig. 2.(a), the source secondary traffic passing
through the N primary cells to its destination both in time and space. In the time axis,
T = α + β, denotes expected active and inactive time of primary nodes. Ton = T Pon = α
represents the expected time that the primary cell is active. Similarly, Toff = T Poff =
β represents the expected time that the primary cell is inactive. In the space axis, we
denote the arrival and departure rates of the secondary traffic along the N primary cells
by λ0, λ1, ..., λN . Especially, λ0 and λN are the source traffic and destination traffic rates,
respectively. For tractable analysis of secondary traffic, we can neglect the multi-hopping
delay as it scales slower than the queuing and transmission delays w.h.p. The relation
between them is justified later in this subsection thus validating this assumption. Without
the loss of generality, we consider the time that the source secondary node is blocked by the
primary cell 1 at time 0 as illustrated in Fig. 2.(a). At first, the source secondary node needs
to buffer its traffic during the time interval [0,Ton], since the primary cell is active. Then,
the source secondary node needs to transmit with the rate λ1 > λ0 to clear this queue within
the time interval [Toff,T ]. The traffic generated by the source secondary node in the period
T can be either forwarded to next intermediate secondary nodes or destination secondary
node in other primary cells. Note that, if the queue of secondary nodes in the primary
cell 1 is not cleared within the time period T and suppose the remaining queue length is
∆Q, in the next on-and-off time circle T of the primary cell 1, the remaining queue length
will be 2∆Q. As this process is repeated after NT , the remaining queue length in the source
secondary node is NT∆Q. As N→∞, the queue length will approach infinity, which makes




By rewriting this equation, we have λ0≤λ1Poff. Since the maximum achievable through-
put capacity of λ1 is Θ(W/
√
n log n), so according to the definition in equ. (2), the feasible
throughput capacity of the source secondary node that guarantees stable transmission over








Note that, if all the left primary cells along the S-D line during the time interval [Toff,T ]
are inactive, the source secondary node can transmit its data smoothly to its destination with
queuing and transmission delays only as T . The source secondary node can achieve the






. However, this scenario is the ideal case
where the primary cells’ on-and-off activity is totally the same as the others which violate
the independence assumption of the primary cells. The general case is that, when secondary
source node intends to transmit its data in [Toff,T ], the location of other primary cells’
which are active at the moment, as in Fig. 2.(a), denoted by t1, t2,t3,..., tN−1, is uniformly
distributed and independent of each other. As denoted by the blue axis in Fig. 2. (a), the
secondary traffic can only pass through during the intersection of inactive time intervals,
denoted by toff, along the concatenated primary cells. Or, the secondary traffic will be
blocked in the queue. One observation is that, the more primary cells the source secondary
traffic passing through, the less the intersection of the inactive time interval of toff. Similar
to eq.(5.4), we have λ0Ton ≤ (λ1 − λ0)toff. Thus, the source secondary traffic rate will be
reduced. However, the corresponding end-to-end queuing and transmission delays will be
small.
According to the above analysis, in the next, we investigate how the source secondary
traffic passing through K successive primary cells during one on-and-off time cycle T ,
where K ∈ {1, 2, ...,N}, and repeats this process until the secondary traffic reaches its des-
tination. This scheduling policy is indicated in the following discussion to be suitable for
all the possible on-and-off distribution of PU activity. Thus this scheduling policy is of
general value, and the throughput capacity (or called ”traffic rate” in the queuing analysis)
and delay tradeoff in CRAHN can be obtained for general conditions.
5.2.2.1 Capacity, Delay and Queue Length with K = 1
We first consider the case where K = 1. Fig. 2.(c) illustrate how the S-D secondary traffic
transmits across the primary cells and achieves the source throughput λ0. In Fig.2.(c).(1),
the source secondary traffic is blocked in the primary cell 1 during the time [0,Ton], since
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the primary nodes are active. So the source secondary node in primary cell 1 should have
a queue of length λ0Ton to store its traffic. During the time [Ton,T ], the secondary node
transmits with the traffic rate λ1 > λ0 to clear its queue and transmits all the traffic to next
secondary nodes in the primary cell 2. The secondary traffic transmitted from primary cell
1 to 2 is λ1Toff = λ0
/
Poff · Toff = λ0T. Next, in Fig.2.(c).(3), during the time [T,T + Ton], the
source secondary node is injecting new traffic into primary cell 1 with queue length λ0Ton,
and the secondary traffic generated during the time [0,T ] with the size λ0T is transmitted
to primary cell 2 during the inactive time of the primary cell 2 where λ0T = λ2Toff. Since
λ0 = Θ(PoffW/
√
n log n), we have λ2 = Θ(W/
√
n log n). Next, in Fig.2.(c).(4), during
the time [T + Ton, 2T ], the secondary traffic with queue length λ0T buffered in primary
cell 1 will be transmitted to primary cell 2 with traffic rate Θ(W/
√
n log n); similarly, the
secondary traffic buffered in primary cell 2 with queue length λ0T will be transmitted to
primary cell 3 with the traffic rate Θ(W/
√
n log n). By repeating this process for time of
NT , the source secondary traffic will reach its destination nodes.
The stable phase of the queues on the S-D line is shown in Fig.2.(d). The traffic rate
of λ1, ..., λN equal to Θ(W/
√
n log n) within primary inactive time slots and equal to zero
within primary active time slots. The feasible source traffic rate in the stable phase is λ0 =
Θ(PoffW/
√
n log n). The average per-node throughput capacity of CRAHN is the average
maximal traffic rate of all S-D pairs transmitted from source to destination nodes. So,
according to the fluid model of traffic [10], the per-node throughput capacity can be referred
as the feasible traffic rate generated from source node that guarantees the stable traffic on
its routing path, that is




Next we compute the average packet queuing and transmission delays. As we al-
ready analyzed, a packet needs the time NT = Θ(li/
√
a (m) · T ) to reach its destination.
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Figure 5.2. Secondary traffic passing through S-D line using routing scheme 2
Θ (1).
Note that, the proposed scheduling strategy are applicable for the worst distribution
of primary on-and-off activity for CRAHN, where Pon≫Poff and Pon→ 1. In this case,
the secondary traffic can only be buffered during every T , and then be transmitted to the
secondary nodes in the next primary cell, This is the exact buffering and scheduling policy
we considered above.
For general Poff and Pon, i.e., Pon ≪ Poff, if Pon → 0, the intersection of inactive time
along any K (2 ≤ K ≤ N) successive primary cells for the limiting case is toff→ T . Thus
the source secondary traffic has chance to pass through more primary cells during T , and
the queuing and transmission delays is reduced. So the average queuing and transmission
delays is consequently upper bounded by:














log n) according to lem-
ma 4. From the definition of the regular dense primary network, to guarantee all the




n/ log n). Compared with eq.(6), this means that the queuing and transmis-
sion delay DQT (n,m) scales faster than the multi-hopping delay DH (n), which is the major
contributing factor to the end-to-end delay, and the delay caused by multi-hopping can be
omitted. Thus, the end-to-end delay is computed from
D (n,m) = O(
√
m). (5.7)
Next we compute the queue length needed for the buffering of secondary traffic. As
shown in Fig.2.(d), in the stable phase, the secondary nodes along the path of N primary
cells need queues to store their traffic, where the length of the queue required in the primary
cell 1 is λ0Ton. In the remaining N − 1 primary cells, the required queue length in each
primary cell is λ0T . In general, Poff or Pon, the total queue length along the S-D line is
upper bounded by O(λ0Ton + (N − 1)λ0T ). Since there are Θ(li/
√
a (n)) secondary nodes
along the S-D line, the average primary cells and secondary nodes over all S-D pairs of










a (n)) = Θ(
√
n). So the











































where W and T are constants. So the average queue length of each secondary node along





). From Lemma 3, we know the







each secondary node, the total queue length required to support all the S-D lines passing
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Figure 5.3. Capacity and delay tradeoff
through it, is given by




















5.2.2.2 Capacity, Delay and Queue Length with K ≥ 1
First we consider the case where K = 2. We need to estimate the secondary traffic rate after
passing through the first two primary cells where the beginning of active time of primary
cell 2 is the random variable t1 with uniform distribution t1 ∼ U (0,T ). To estimate the
intersection time toff of primary cell 1 and 2 for all the S-D pairs, according to central















T = P2offλ1. Since we need to obtain the maximum source
throughput capacity λ0. We can set λ0 = P2offλ1. In this case, the transmitted traffic which
is buffered in the queue of the intermediate secondary node in the primary cell 2 is λ0T .







n log n)/T = Θ(WP2off/
√
n log n).
For general K (K ≥ 2), similarly as in K = 1, the source secondary traffic of size λ0T
will be transmitted and buffered at the secondary nodes in the Kth primary cells within the
time cycle T . Then the traffic will be transmitted and buffered at the next K primary cells
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within the next time cycle T . We repeat this process until the traffic reaches the destination



















Because the secondary traffic passes K primary cells with every T time, the corresponding
queuing and transmission delays is










Similar as K = 1, in this case, there are onlyΘ(
√
n/K) secondary nodes to buffer secondary
traffic along the S-D line. The average total queue length required for each secondary node
to support all the S-D lines passing through it, is given by




















Let K = Θ(
√
m)/K, we obtain the results in Theorem 2.
From Theorem 2, we can draw the capacity and delay trade-off curve. As an example,
in Fig. 3 we show the results for m = 100 and different values of Poff.
Substituting K = 1 in Theorem 2, we can obtain the Theorem 1 as a special case. Note




log n) scales faster than DQT (n,m)=O(1),
which is the major contributing factor to the end-to-end delay.
The following theorem claims the maximum achievable throughput capacity of CRAH-
N using the Routing Scheme 2.





the Routing Scheme 2, the maximum achievable per-node throughput capacity for CRAHN














Proof Substituting K = Θ(
√
m) in Theorem 2, we can directly derive this theorem. Also,
as a special case, the detailed steps of the derivation can be constructed from the proof of
Theorem 2 in Section III.B.1).
From Theorem 3, we can determine that without packet losses and having enough queue
length to combat the packet loss due to the PU activity, the maximum achievable per-




off to a linear factor Poff when compared with results by using the Routing Scheme 1.





. Moreover, the end-to-end queuing and transmission delays are largely
increased to O(
√
m). Since the delay perceived by a packet is more QoS relevant than the
total network throughput, we need to use the results of Theorem 2 as a guidance to get the
best throughput and delay trade-off. For Q (n,m), when increasing the density m of primary
nodes, the queue length of secondary nodes will increase in the order of
√
m. Otherwise
when increasing the density n of secondary nodes, the queue length of the secondary nodes
will decrease in the order of
√
n. This result coincides with the intuitive observation. From
Theorem 3, we can also determine that when Poff = 0, that means all the primary nodes are
active, no secondary nodes can transmit at all. Thus, the capacity of CRAHN is zero and
the queue length of each secondary node is zero. When Poff = 1, the primary nodes are
always inactive. In this case, CRAHN behaves the same as a traditional ad hoc wireless
network. These special cases verify our results in Theorem 3.
5.3 Capacity and Delay of CRAHN under Regular Sparse Primary
Network
In this section, we consider another typical scenario similar to the regular dense primary
network, where the primary nodes’ density is low and transmission range is small than




; the transmission range 0 ≤ r (m) ≤
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a (n)/2 guarantees there are always secondary nodes outside of the transmis-
sion ranges of primary cells, and finding a routing path outside of primary transmission
range (besides source and destination cells) is proved to be always feasible (in lemma 4).
In Fig. 4, the typical routing path S-R-D that avoid primary nodes’ transmission range
is named as detour routing. This network is defined as regular sparse primary network.
The following lemma proves that the detour routing scheme has the same order of routes
traverse any micro cell as the S-D line routing schemes in lemma 3.




Proof From lemma 3 we know that the number of S-D lines traversing a single micro cell
are O(n
√
a (n)). Now, consider the number of routes of using S-R-D routing scheme that
passed through the uncovered secondary micro cells. Since it is enough to fill all the S-R-D
line on all the uncovered region of secondary micro cells, In the worst case where primary
nodes have the largest transmission range as in Fig. 3, the area of these uncovered region












. So, the number of route of








Figure 5.5. CRAHN under random dense primary network









a (n)/2, the maximum achiev-









Proof Let us denote the length of the straight line that connects the S-D pair is li as in
Fig. 4. For any S-R-D pair, the length of its detour routing path, as shown in Fig. 4, is at
most
√
2li. As we known [10], the constant difference of the length of routing path does
not change the delay scaling order. Moreover, from lemma 5, we know the detour rout-
ing scheme does not change the route numbers in each each micro cells in the uncovered
region of primary nodes. Ignoring the impact of PU activity on its covered secondary n-
odes, according to the TDMA transmission scheme, only one out of O(n
√
a (n)) S-D pairs
can transmit with no interference to other S-D pairs. So the throughout capacity is upper
bounded by (and the upper bound is achievable) 1/O(n
√
a (n)), which is the same as the
results in classic wireless networks [10].
Now we consider the scalability of CRAHN with the all possible locations of nodes:
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source and/or destination secondary nodes are covered or uncovered in the PUs’ transmis-
sion ranges. Let X be the Poisson random variable of secondary nodes density with mean
n and standard deviation
√
n in the square region. The mean and standard number of sec-




• For any t > 1, Pr(|X − E[X]| ≥ t · σ[X]) ≤ 1t2 .
Accordingly, for any ε > 0 and fixed r(m), we can obtain
Pr
(













As n → ∞, we can make this quantity arbitrarily small. So the number of secondary
nodes in any primary node’s transmission range is nπr2(m). Similarly, when n → ∞, we
can prove the number of secondary nodes in a primary cell (square region) is n/m. So
the probability for a secondary node in any primary node’s transmission range is Pin =
πr2(m)/ 1m ; the probability for a secondary node out of any primary node’s transmission
range is Pout = 1 − πr2(m)/ 1m . Note that, to calculate the throughput capacity of CRAHN,
we choose the source and destination nodes randomly. So there are four possible cases of
choosing S-D pairs:
• Source and destination nodes are both in primary nodes’ transmission range, then the
probability is PinPin
• Source node is in a primary nodes’ transmission range, destination node is out of
primary nodes’ transmission range, then the probability is PinPout
• Source node is out of primary nodes’ transmission range, destination node is in pri-
mary nodes’ transmission range, then the probability is PoutPin
• Source and destination nodes are both out of primary nodes’ transmission range, then
the probability is PoutPout.
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Figure 5.6. CRAHN under random sparse primary network
When Routing Scheme 2 is used, then the case (1) is a special case in the proof of
Theorem 3, where m = 2. So the capacity is Θ(WPoff/
√
n log n), and the queuing and
transmission delays is 2T . Case (2) and (3) are special cases in the proof of Theorem 3,
where m = 1. The capacity is Θ(WPoff/
√
n log n), and the queuing and transmission delays
is T . Case (4) is the same as in classical ad hoc network scenarios, so the capacity is
Θ(W/
√
n log n). As a result, the average per-node throughput capacity of CRAHN is

















From eq.(5.14), we can determine that the throughput capacity of CRAHN is tightly re-
lated to the value of primary nodes’ density and the transmission range. When r (m) = 0 or
m→0, CRAHN achieves the maximum capacity Θ(W/
√








, CRAHN achieves the minimum capacity Θ(WPoff/
√
n log n).
For the required queue, it is only demanded by the secondary nodes which are covered
within source and destination primary cells. They are constant values, and their length will
approach zero as n→ ∞. To compute the end-to-end delay, we have the multi-hopping




log n), which scales faster than the queuing and transmission delays
O (2T ). So the end-to-end delay is:
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Compare to Routing Scheme 2, the main difference of Routing Scheme 1 is the differ-
ence of lower bound capacity Ω(WP2off/
√
n log n). Note that the upper bound capacity and
end-to-end delay remain the same for both schemes. Thus, we complete the proof, and the
maximum achievable throughput capacity is achieved by using Routing Scheme 2.
From Theorem 4, we can observe significant improvement of network throughput ca-
pacity and delay by the detour routing scheme, since the impact of PU activity on the
secondary routing path is largely reduced.
5.4 Capacity and Delay of CRAHN under Random Primary Network
In the last sections III and IV, we considered the regular primary network where secondary
nodes are homogeneous nodes with equal transmission ranges placed regularly in the net-
work. Generally, the primary nodes can be randomly distributed in a network region, and
the location and transmission range of each primary node might be different from each
other. We call these networks as random primary networks. The definition are similar as
regular primary networks, where the density and transmission range of them have the same
scalability. However, the location of primary nodes are randomly distributed now. The
corresponding dense and sparse primary networks for CRAHN are illustrated in Figs. 5
and 6.
Theorem 5: The throughput capacity and delay of CRAHNs under random (dense or
sparse) primary networks scale the same order as in regular (dense or sparse) primary
networks, respectively.
Proof As a typical illustration, we consider there are m primary nodes randomly distribut-
ed in the unit square region. The transmission range of a primary node follows a uniform








, where r and R are the lower and upper bound con-
stants. For the random dense primary network, the primary nodes are randomly located
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and are grouped together in a dense form as shown in Fig. 5. The value of r and R need to
satisfy the following two conditions:
0 ≤ r ≤ 1
2
≤ R ≤ 1; r2 + R2 + Rr ≤ 1. (5.16)
to guarantee a valid distribution of transmission ranges in this region. For the S-D line with







































m). Since only the number
of primary cells along S-D lines impacts the scaling performance (both throughput capacity
and delay) of CRAHN and the size of the transmission range does not impact the scalability
order, the scaling laws of CRAHN in random dense primary network are similar to the
regular dense primary network cases. There is only a constant difference 12(R−r) ln
R
r which
does not change the scalability. Due to similar reason, as in Fig. 5, we can prove that the
scaling laws of CRAHN under random sparse primary network are the same as the regular




In this dissertation, we have studied power control and capacity analysis for cognitive
radio networks. The main contributions are summarized as follows.
6.1 Power Control in Cognitive Radio Networks
The main results and conclusions of the proposed power-control problems are summarized
as follows.
6.1.1 Power Control in Wideband Cognitive Radio Networks
In this work, a joint power- and rate-control problem is considered for individual SU in
wideband CRNs through a game theoretical approach. Proper utility function that guaran-
tees the fairness and energy efficiency among SUs has been adopted. The formulated joint
power- and rate-control problem that satisfies both the interference power constraints and
QoS requirements of each SU is difficult to solve through classic optimization theory. To
characterize the interference, the concept of pricing is introduced from game theory into
the utility functions in the analysis. Thus, the proposed problem is a non-cooperative joint
power- and rate-control game with interference power pricing. The existence, uniqueness,
and Pareto efficiency of Nash equilibrium for this game are presented. By using the an-
alytical results, a distributive joint power- and rate-control algorithm is proposed to finds
optimal rate and power for each SU. Moreover, the feasible pricing problem for the CRN
is discussed. The numerical results show that our proposed algorithm can provide larg-
er transmission rates for SUs with less transmit powers when compared to conventional
power-control problems in CRNs that proves the joint power and rate control is an ef-
fective approach to improve utility and spectrum utilization of CR networks. Moreover,
introducing the pricing into the joint power- and rate-control problem can largely improve
the network utility.
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6.1.2 Power Control in Fading Multi-Channel Cognitive Radio Networks
In this research, the distributed multi-channel power-control problem is investigated for CR
networks over fading channels with channel outage constraints. The fundamental perfor-
mance traits of multiple CR user power control in the presence of multiple PUs in fading
channels is presented for the first time. The properties of N.E. for our game are analyzed,
and a distributed power-control algorithm is proposed to solve the game, which converges
to the N.E. Finally, the performance of our algorithms are investigated through simulation
results, which demonstrates the results shown in theory.
6.1.3 Learning-based Power-Control Game Cognitive Radio Networks
In this work, a robust power-control algorithm with low implementation complexity is de-
signed for competitive and autonomous CR networks for the first time. The general feature
of ”asymptotically stationary in the average sense” property is modeled in wireless environ-
ments. This formulated problem is an incomplete-information repeated game with learn-
ing automata, and the interesting property of the asymptotically equivalence of the classic
complete-information case and the incomplete-information power-control game proposed
in this work are established in this study.
Unlike traditional approaches, the game-theoretical problem is formulated as a strictly
diagonal concave game, which proves the uniqueness of the power-control game with nice
mathematical structure and interpretation. To solve this mixed-strategy repeated power-
control game, Bush-Mosteller reinforcement scheme is proposed, in which the reinforce-
ment procedure that uses the Lagrange multipliers and an appropriate regularization is
shown to be the optimal response within the given constraints for each CR user. Using
the stochastic optimization techniques, the convergence of the game to the Nash equilibri-
um is analyzed with the rate of the learning to be o(n−1/3). This proposed algorithm is very
adaptable and can be applicable to any hostile radio-access environments and uncoordinat-
ed CR users for the practical applications of real-world CR networks.
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6.2 Capacity Analysis in Cognitive Radio Networks
The main results and contributions of the fundamental throughput capacity scaling for
large-scale wireless ad hoc networks are summarized as follows:
• Under the regular dense primary network, using TDMA-based routing scheme as in










. In this case, the throughput capacity drains exponentially
with the increasing density m of primary nodes. The corresponding end-to-end delay
is only for multi-hopping as in [10].
• When secondary nodes consider PU activity, and use additional queue to buffer traf-
fic when primary nodes are active, otherwise they can transmit, then the maximum
achievable throughput capacity is improved to Θ( WPoff√
n log n
) which scales down by a
factor Poff (0≤Poff≤1) compared to classical wireless ad hoc networks. Moreover, to
achieve this throughput capacity improvement, the end-to-end delay capturing queu-




and the order of queue length





• The throughput capacity and delay trade-off for CRAHNs in the regular dense pri-






)vsO(K), where1≤ K ≤Θ(
√
m). Specifically,
increasing the end-to-end delay results in exponential increase of the throughput ca-
pacity and vice versa.
• Under the regular sparse primary network, both the throughput capacity and delay of
CRAHNs will be greatly improved. In this case, the per-node throughput capacity of
CRAHN is between Ω( WPoff√
n log n
) and O( W√
n log n
). The corresponding end-to-end delay
is only affected by multi-hopping delay as in [10].
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